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EVALUATION REPORT



**UDF-AFG-12-508 / Involving women and youth CSOs in strengthening
democratic debate and public news media around elections in Afghanistan**

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I. Executive Summary

(i) Project Data

The *Involving women and youth civil society organizations (CSOs) in strengthening democratic debate and public news media around the elections in Afghanistan* project sought to strengthen the voice of civil society and foster sustainable democratic practices within Afghanistan by deepening the public debate around the electoral processes among women and youth. Its intended outcomes were to: 1) increase awareness on the importance of participation in the 2014 presidential election process and its relevance to Afghanistan's development among women and youth; 2) increase the role of women and youth CSOs in generating effective debate around the democratic elements of the electoral process and the accountability of elected officials; and, 3) enhance the monitoring of the accountability and transparency of the elected officials through the democratic news media with the active involvement of women and youth CSOs.

This was a fifteen-month USD 250,000 project (1 January 2014 - 31 March 2015) including a three-month no-cost extension. It was implemented by the Development and Humanitarian Services for Afghanistan (DHSA), an Afghan Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) based in Kabul. It partnered with The Killid Group (TKG) an independent Afghan public media group established by DHSA to implement the project. Its main intended activities were to:

- Create an awareness raising campaign focused on women and youth for the elections based on information collected from relevant CSOs;
- Cover electoral-related issues and the participation of women and youth through public service announcements (PSAs) and investigative reports in 13 provinces;
- Inform the PSAs through the collection of information on the expectations, concerns and needs of women and youth in the electoral process in seven provinces;
- Establish an interactive journalist - CSO network to share information, mentor reporters on CSO roles and core democratic principles, and monitor the performance, accountability and transparency of elected officials; and,
- Continue the PSAs and reporting in the post-electoral period on the electoral results, Afghanistan's structure of power, and accountability of elected officials.

(ii) Evaluation Findings

The project objectives were directly **relevant** to the needs to strengthen the voice and participation of women and youth for the 2014 presidential election process and with the newly elected officials. Although Afghanistan has undergone a major democratic transformation, it still faced major challenges. It is still a patriarchic society and the role of women and youth are marginalized, especially in rural areas. Linking this effort to the 2014 electoral process was also particularly relevant as this was Afghanistan's first democratic transition of power from one democratically elected government to another-- an important benchmark for the consolidation and stability of its democratic systems. The use of radio to diffuse information was also relevant given Afghanistan's difficult terrain and the rural nature of much of its population who rely on radio for information. The project lost relevance however in implementation. Only a few activities were done in the pre-electoral period and only a portion of the intended CSO-journalist elements were done. In addition, the predominate use of Pashto in the round tables and reporting, narrowed its relevance to the two-thirds of the country that use Dari.

The effectiveness of the project is difficult to determine because of the lack of performance data. Project implementation seems to have focused on the production and broadcasting of media products and many of the CSO elements foreseen in the design were not done, such as the training, mentoring and monitoring. Most activities started late- after the first electoral or second electoral round. These all affected the achievement of project objectives. The round table radio debates largely followed the project design and were likely **effective** at relaying the concerns and issues of the women and youth CSOs which participated. Workshops were done with CSOs in six locations, at the end of the project. These were too late to have informed much of the products and lacked the follow up needed to make them effective. The PSAs started after the first round and reflected citizen concerns and hopes that the new government would improve the situation. These likely served more as a journalistic snap shot of the situation than as educational or monitoring tools as they did not have that type of a focus. The content of the investigative reports were similar and significant effort was put into their development by the participating journalists each of which visited several provinces. However, they were not broadcast until months after they were written, and few participants appeared to have heard them broadcast or read them as articles published in the two magazines.

TKG appears to have an **efficient** radio operation, using its network of seven stations and its links to community radios to extend the reach of the materials broadcast. The project inputs were consistent with the delivery of the activities but not with the intended outcomes. That would have required much more focus on the more programmatic elements of the design and on the higher level outcomes. This is reflected in the project budget which had a heavy emphasis on the development of media products, with only 10 percent intended for the more programmatic activities (civil society - journalist mentoring, training and workshops). According to the final financial report, the budget was used largely as outlined in the Project Document, except for those programmatic elements. It used only about one percent of the budget for this effort and the remainder was expended on the media products and personnel. There was a big turnover of project managers (3) for such a short term project, and no orientations or training for participating media staff and journalists was evident. Basic project management systems that would collect and aggregate project performance data appeared absent beyond project outputs.

Results data was not collected by the project and there was almost no anecdotal information available on the results of the project. Killid reportedly reaches seven to eight million people in 16 provinces, and the news magazines circulates about 9,000 copies. With this reach, it is likely that this project increased listener awareness on certain topics discussed in the various media products. It also likely extended TKGs reach to CSOs in some areas through the round tables and workshops. These brought in some new CSOs into contact with them. The UNDEF grant also allowed TKG to do more in depth reports on the electoral process than it would have been able to do without the external funding. This in turn helped Killid to become more proactive in its news creation and reporting. Identifying **impact** beyond this is not possible without information.

The project focused on the production and broadcasting of products by an established radio group which continues to operate through other donor funding and advertising and other revenues. Doing the same type of in depth investigative reports is not **sustainable** without obtaining another sponsor. Killid used primarily its own reporters and staff to implement the project so any experience and knowledge gained under the project would remain with them and DHS/Killid. Killid continues to use some of the CSOs for information or as participants in some of its programming but many of those relationship appear to pre-date the project.

(iii) Conclusions

- The **project's intended outcomes and the delivery of impartial reports and educational messages on the democratic and electoral processes are important and needed in the context.** This is especially the case for rural areas where the population receives less attention and information, and who can be easily reached through radio.

- The **project focused on the production of journalistic products and its programmatic elements were not sufficiently developed, and in some cases were not done.** These were needed to achieve the higher level development outcomes sought by the project.

- The **media products reflected the mood of the country and were not sufficiently developed as tools that could strengthen the voice and participation of women and youth and ensure the accountability of elected officials** which were the primarily objectives sought by the project.

- The **electoral process and its problems might have contributed to issues encountered in project implementation, but there was significant need to strengthen project management and train project staff** on the objectives of the project and the rationale for the CSO elements that were woven into the project design, and on project performance monitoring and reporting.

- The **grantee made efforts to provide balanced programming in its round tables and reporting, but this was offset by the predominate use of Pashto** in some media products **and a focus on problems** rather than solutions in many of the media products. Ensuring language balance was especially important as the campaigns became polarized along ethnic lines, and to avoid marginalizing the majority Dari speaking population from the project and its benefits.

- The **project might have had more significant results than were visible** to the evaluation team, but **it is not possible to know as monitoring results beyond outputs were not tracked.**

(iv) Recommendations

- For similar projects in the future, the evaluators recommend that grantees **give more focus on ensuring project activities embody the project purpose and contribute more directly to the achievement of the project outcomes.**

- Project staff and reporters should be given **a substantive orientation and training at the start of the project** on the objectives of the project so they better understand the links between the activities and the intended outcomes, how and why certain activities are done, and how project performance is measured.

- The project should also **strengthen its links with CSOs and other development organizations dealing with civic education, gender issues, the electoral process and democratization issues** to ensure the more programmatic elements remain in the forefront of project implementation and provide a mechanism that can follow up on the issues identified in reporting, as well as to undertake the monitoring that was foreseen in the design.

- PSAs and other **civic educational-type materials should be grounded in the national mood, but focused on constructive information** and targeted on a campaign

designed to achieve specific results that can help listeners understand the situation, know what they need to do, and manage their post-electoral expectations. Elections are only one part of the democratization process and cannot generate change by themselves.

- Grantees should also ***ensure projects have a monitoring and evaluation system in place that uses appropriate indicators, tracks project performance and collects baseline and impact information*** so the outcomes of project activities can be captured as well as their outputs. This information not only helps track project performance but can help better target content for PSAs, reporting, round tables and workshops.

II. Introduction and development context

(i) **The project and evaluation objectives**

Involving women and youth civil society organizations (CSOs) in strengthening democratic debate and public news media around elections in Afghanistan project (UDF-AFG-12-508) was a fifteen-month USD 250,000 project implemented by Development and Humanitarian Services For Afghanistan (DHSA) and its media arm, The Killid Group (TKG). USD 25,000 of this was retained by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation purposes. The project ran from 1 January 2014 to 31 March 2015 which included a three month no-cost time extension. Its main objective was to strengthen the voice of civil society and foster sustainable democratic practices within Afghanistan by generating a deeper public debate among women and youth CSOs around the 2014 presidential electoral process. This in turn would reinforce political rights and democratic practices as well as encourage the participation of women and youth.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger evaluation of the Rounds 2, 3 and 4 UNDEF-funded projects. Its purpose is to “contribute towards a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved”.¹

(ii) **Evaluation methodology**

The evaluation took place in August - September 2015 with field work done in Afghanistan from 29 August to 6 September. The evaluation was conducted by Sue Nelson and Latifeh Jafari (Alavi), experts in democratic governance and electoral processes. The UNDEF evaluations are more qualitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluation questions that focus on the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and any value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex 1). This report follows that structure. The evaluators reviewed available documentation on the project, on the role of the women and youth CSOs in the public debate around the elections, and the coverage of their concerns in the media (Annex 2). The team also reviewed the project’s media products, investigative reports and public service announcements (PSAs).

The field work in Afghanistan was done by the national expert, with the international expert participating virtually. The national expert met with DHSA, TKG and with project journalists in participants in Kabul and Balkh. She also met with The Asia Foundation (TAF) and the United National Development Programme (UNDP) programme officer who had monitored the project’s Milestone Number 3. A sample of journalists and participants from another six provinces were interviewed by phone, skype and/or e-mail. The list is provided in Annex 3.

During the preparatory work, the evaluators identified several issues which they followed up during their interviews. These included:

- **Level of participation by CSOs** as the Project Document discussed an active participation by local CSOs which was not reflected in project reporting;
- **Use of the network of reporters - CSOs** which was also not evident in reporting and whether this created a “new system of reporting” as anticipated in the Project Document;

¹ Operational Manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, p. 6.

- **Criteria used to select topics for PSA messages and investigative reports** and their effectiveness;
- **Timeline of activity implementation** and disaggregated data on the activities as this information was not provided in project reporting; and,
- **Extent of and attribution for results** since the project reporting is descriptive in nature and the large number of other efforts done for the elections.

In addition, the team assessed the issues raised by UNDEF:

- **Impact of PSAs, radio programmes and investigative reporting** on participation and if there is any data that allowed for the measuring of its impact; and,
- **Impact of clustering the investigative reporting** in a short period of time instead of spreading it out over a longer time on the intended audience.

(iii) Development context

Afghanistan has undergone a major transition since 2001 and the end of the Taliban government. It adopted a democratic constitution, organized presidential, parliamentary and provincial council elections and re-established its state structures. It developed vigorous media and civil society sectors and went through two electoral cycles. However, its transition is still fragile and Afghanistan faces serious socio-economic and governance challenges. Among these, continuing insecurity and the overshadowing of state institutions and the rule of law by traditional systems, ethnic divisions, patronage and impunity.²

Afghanistan's population is predominately rural (67 percent) which has more limited access to information, education and job opportunities than their urban counterparts. Although women make up almost half of the population (49 percent) and equal rights are guaranteed in the legal framework, it remains a patriarchal society. Power, authority and influence are equated with men, while women are perceived as accountable to men.³ Youth are also marginalized by their age and circumstance, even though 63 percent of the population is under the age of 24. Afghan youth are increasingly literate (84 percent in 2013 compared to 39 percent in 2008) and this educated youth bulge provides Afghanistan with an opportunity for economic and democratic development. However, youth face limited higher educational and economic opportunities and are becoming increasingly disaffected with the political system. This makes them extremely vulnerable to the recruiting efforts of insurgent groups in some parts of the country.⁴

The 2014 presidential elections were an important benchmark for Afghanistan's democratic transition. It represented the first peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected president from another. However, in the months before the elections, surveys showed that the Afghan people were becoming increasingly uneasy as the presidential elections and the transition from the NATO-led forces to the Afghan government approached. Public confidence in national institutions and public officials was at an eight-year low. Citizens worried about voting security, corruption and unemployment. Nevertheless, most felt Afghanistan was going in the right direction and that the government's reconciliation efforts could help stabilize the country.⁵

The media plays an important role Afghanistan for the democratic and electoral processes, both as a source of information and as a public watchdog. The media has saturated

² Research for a Better Afghanistan, Governance in Afghanistan, p 2

³ USIP, Supporting Afghan Women in the 2014 Transition

⁴ Information on youth from Samuel Hall Consulting, Afghanistan's Future in Transition: A participatory Assessment of the Afghan Youth

⁵ TAF, Afghanistan in 2013, a Survey of the Afghan People

Afghanistan. There are about 65 local and national television channels, 174 radio stations, 200 print outlets and 12 news agencies.⁶ According to 2014 European Union (EU) election observer reports, a large part of the media is partisan and allocated more than 75 percent of their primetime coverage to a specific presidential candidate during the campaign period.⁷ Radio is the most widespread source for information (80 percent) although television has increased in importance (54 percent). The rural population is more likely to rely on radio news more than urban dwellers who also use their mobile phones (57 percent).⁸ For the 2014 presidential elections, televised presidential candidate debates were held in February and March 2014.

Voter information was a priority for these elections. As an example, the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) broadcast 414 PSAs in prime time programming in the week before the first round of the elections and doubled this for the second round, while broadcasters devoted 22 percent of their prime time election coverage to PSAs.⁹

Women are an important voting block, making up 49 percent of the registered voters. Their political participation rates, however, are lower than men's. Factors include their more limited access to education and especially higher education, cultural constraints and the difficulties in accessing registration centers in rural areas. Security is another major factor. Five of the six provinces with the lowest voter turnout rates for women were considered as high threat by the Ministry of Interior's pre-election security assessment. In the TAF survey, only 53 percent of respondents thought women should decide who to vote for on their own-- and these were primarily the women themselves and urban residents. In addition, the women's registry has been manipulated in cases of electoral fraud in the past.¹⁰

The first round presidential elections were held on 5 April 2014. Observers characterized the campaign as competitive (11 candidates) but primarily centered on candidate personalities. Turnout for these elections was at 38.9 percent which was similar to the turnout in 2009.¹¹ Women's turnout was 36 percent in the first round and 37.6 in the second round.¹²

None of the candidates won a majority so the two candidates with the most first round votes went to the second round. These were Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. Observers felt the second round was more ethnically divisive with Ghani seem as the Pashtun candidate and Abdullah as receiving support from mainly ethnic Tajiks.

The second round was held on 14 June 2014. It generated widespread allegations of fraud, creating a political deadlock that ultimately required United Nation (UN) and United States mediation and an audit of the results done under UN guidance. A political agreement was reached on 21 September 2014 which created a national unity government with Ghani as president and Abdullah in the newly created post of chief executive. They were inaugurated on 29 September 2014.¹³

6 Freedom House, Afghanistan, Freedom of the Press 2014

7 EU Election Assessment Team, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Final Report, Presidential Elections, p 19

8 TAF Op Cit, p 12

9 EU, Op Cit, p 19

10 EU, Op Cit, pps 5 and 23

11 International IDEA, Voter turnout data for Afghanistan

12 EU Op Cit

13 Ibid

III. Project strategy

(i) Project approach and strategy

With this project, DHSA intended to strengthen the voice of women and youth CSOs in the debate around the 2014 presidential electoral process in order to encourage the participation of youth and women and strengthen the accountability and transparency of elected officials. Although Afghanistan is undergoing a democratic transition, its democratic culture is nascent and the voice of women and youth is exceedingly weak. Previous elections were marred by accusations of fraud and government corruption, and many of the electorate have become disaffected from elections. A 2012 TAF survey found that only 40 percent of the respondents intended to vote in the next presidential elections and that most Afghans trusted their religious and traditional councils more than formal government structures or elected officials.¹⁴

In particular, DHSA intended this project to address the:

- **Weakness of the Afghan state** which allows tribes to co-opt the state apparatus and exercise their own form of representation, democracy and arbitrary use of power;
- **Lack of public awareness on why democratic participation is important** and the links between sustainable development, democratic participation and accountable governance;
- **Ineffectiveness of replicating a Western electoral agenda** without grounding it in the realities of the Afghan context; and,
- **Need for a fuller participation by women and youth** who swing between hope and fear and who are needed to bring in new ideas, attitudes and generate sustainable democratic change.

DHSA expected to address these problem areas by undertaking a public awareness campaign of investigative reports and dissemination of public opinions gathered from CSOs working on the concerns of women and youth in the lead up to the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections and in the post-electoral period. This was to be done through DHSA's media arm, The Killid Group, and its radio and newspaper outlets. It intended to promote the media products through social marketing in collaboration with participating CSOs. They also intended to use radio, television spots, flyers, announcements and billboards to increase the visibility of this campaign. They planned to concentrate in the pre-electoral period on the demands of women and youth in order to increase their voice and participation. It also intended to issue investigative reports on the real democratic situation of the country so that voters would be aware of the need to vote and to foster democratic governance. After the elections, the awareness campaign would focus on the hopes and aspirations of women and youth, need for accountability and building a sustainable peace.

DHSA intended to use its system of seven provincial radio stations that reached 10 provinces (Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Khost, Nimroz, Baglan and Kunduz) to broadcast the messages and reporting as well as TKG's two national weekly magazines--Killid which targets CSOs and decision makers, and Mursal which is geared towards women and families.

¹⁴ UDF-AFG-12-508, *Project Document*, p 3

In particular, this project intended to:

- **Create a live 30 minute radio program on elections and participation** to be broadcast twice a month to 13 provinces made up of roundtables and phone in calls from listeners in the pre- and post-electoral period.
- **Broadcast voter education focused PSAs through Killid Radio** on the constitution, rights to vote, candidates platforms and national issues such as reconciliation. Two one-minute PSAs were intended to be produced monthly, in both Dari and Pashto, with TKG providing the airtime as its in-kind contribution.
- **Provide monthly investigative reporting on democratization issues** to increase the awareness of voters on the real situation of Afghanistan's democratic transition and encourage accountability of elected officials. These were to be distributed through TKG's radio network and two weekly national magazines.
- **Create an interactive journalists-CSO network to share information**, mentor local journalists and monitor concerns of women and youth in the pre- and post-election context.

Linking TKG's independent media to known youth and women's CSOs was expected to provide insight into reporting on the target groups' needs and expectations for the elections as well as to serve as a means to expand the project's reach to these groups. This would help women and youth realize the importance of their role in the 2014 elections and the need for participation. It was also expected to inform candidates on their needs and expectations and increase public demand for their accountability and transparency.

The intended outcomes for this project were: (i) *increased awareness on the importance of taking part in the presidential election process and on its relevance with regards to the country's development among women and youth*; (ii) *increased role of women and youth CSOs in generating effective debate around the role of the presidential election, the electoral process, accountability and transparency of the elected authorities and overall building of democracy in Afghanistan*; and (iii) *enhanced monitoring of accountability and transparency of the elected authorities through the democratic news media with an active involvement of women and youth's CSOs*.

There were a number of assumptions underlying the project strategy. This included that the economic and security environment allowed for activities and the project to be implemented, that the media environment would remain open for independent and investigatory reporting and the investigative reporters would be able to conduct their work without intimidation. It also assumed that the voters would be receptive to the messages and that the exchange rate would remain stable. The project intended to mitigate these risks by adjusting activity locations as needed by the security situation, and consulting with CSOs by phone and skype if the security situation worsened considerably.

The project intended to create a new trend in reporting that would impact on other independent media. This would ensure the sustainability of the relationship between CSOs and TKG. It also expected to develop a network of media - civil society actors that would continue beyond the end of the project. DHSAs also hoped that a successful project could generate funding by other donors to continue these types of civic information efforts.

(ii) Logical framework

Project activities

Intended outcomes

Medium-term impacts

Long-term development objective

Increased awareness on participating in 2014 electoral process and its relevance

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 30-minute radio programme twice a month (2 months) • 4 1-minute PSAs a day (2 months) • 1 investigative report a month in lead up to elections (2 months) in 13 provinces and in 2 national magazines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased awareness on democratization issues and electoral concerns of youth and women • Deeper public debate around electoral process by women and youth • More knowledgeable vote • Increased voter turnout among women and youth 	<p>More active participation of women and youth in democratic electoral and governance processes</p> <p>Increased civic understanding of role of state and elections in democratic governance</p>	<p>More inclusive and responsive political and governmental processes</p> <p>More sustainable democratic practices</p>
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Increased role of women and youth CSOs in public discourse related to electoral process and accountability

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-election concerns of women and youth identified • Interactive journalist - CSO network created and operating • 2 mentoring and trainings of media specialists and CSOs • Post-electoral monitoring by CSOs, reported by TKG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSO input used to inform project products • Deeper public debate on issues of concern to women and youth • Strengthened public role of CSOs in pre- and post-electoral period • Increased voice of women and youth • Candidates aware of needs women and youth 	<p>Strengthened role of women and youth in the electoral/ democratic processes</p> <p>More responsive candidates and elected officials to needs/ concerns of women and youth</p>	<p>More inclusive political and governmental processes</p> <p>More sustainable democratic processes</p>
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Enhanced media monitoring of elected authorities with CSO collaboration

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of candidate promises monitored in 13 provinces • Post- election Issues covered on radio in hourly news shows and news magazines • 1 30-minute radio programmes produced and broadcast twice a month (8 months) • 4 1-minute PSAs broadcast 4 times/day for 8 months • 1 investigative report/ month on transparency/ accountability etc after the elections in 13 provinces and 2 national magazines (8 months) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased awareness of voters on electoral results, and their impact on future of democratic development in Afghanistan • Public officials more aware of need to implement campaign promises, be accountable and follow formal rules 	<p>Increased accountability and transparency of elected officials</p> <p>More equitable services and policies</p>	<p>Strengthened governance</p> <p>Strengthened rule of law</p> <p>More sustainable democratic practices</p>
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IV. Evaluation findings

(i) Relevance

The project was directly relevant to the mission of the grantee, DHSA and its radio arm, The Killid Group. DHSA is a well established NGO based in Kabul whose mission is to *redefine development in Afghanistan by promoting a dynamic, and capable civil society as a means to fostering local ownership for development, dignity, and a peaceful and sustainable future for all Afghans*.¹⁵ The Killid Group has a radio network of seven stations and shares programming with another 28 location stations.¹⁶ It has two national weekly magazines committed to the “*people’s right to be informed and to be heard which is the basis for good governance, accountability and transparency*.” This philosophy was at the heart of the project design.

The design was directly relevant to the objectives of the project and to the electoral cycle, but was extremely ambitious. It anticipated spending all of the funding in a one year period before, during and after the 2014 presidential elections. It intended to engage with local CSOs and Killid’s radio network to develop a new system of reporting that would be informed by youth and women’s CSO voice and monitoring efforts, and produced public awareness messages to increase their targeted groups’ understanding of the Afghan democratic context in relation to the elections, raise the voice of women and youth CSOs and ensure the accountability of elected officials through their radio programming and print materials.



Killid-CSO post-elections meeting on transparency and accountability campaign Kabul

Photo: DHSA

This was extremely relevant to the needs of the Afghan electoral and democratization processes. Although women and youth have gained significant rights in the democratic system, they are still marginalized by tradition and culture. The 2014 presidential elections were also a critical benchmark in Afghanistan’s democratic transition as they marked the first transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another. A credible election with good participation was critical for the continued stability of its political system. The use of radio to diffuse information was particularly relevant given Afghanistan’s difficult terrain and the rural nature of much of its population, who rely primarily on radio for information.

The project lost relevance during implementation. Only a few activities were done in the pre-electoral period and only a portion of the intended CSO-journalist elements were implemented. This limited its relevance to achieving the project’s intended outcomes as well as to the electoral process which it was intended to support. In addition, the predominate use of Pashto in the round tables and reporting, narrowed its relevance nationally as Pashto is only spoken by about 35 percent of the country.¹⁷

¹⁵ DHSA, About US.

¹⁶ TKG, Radio Killid,

¹⁷ Afghanistan Online, *Languages, A Look at the Languages Spoken in Afghanistan*

(ii) Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the project is difficult to ascertain because of the lack of performance data. Project implementation seemed to have focused almost exclusively on the production of the media products and many of the CSO elements foreseen in the design were not developed, and, in the case of the CSO-journalist mentoring and training, were not done. Most activities did not follow the timeline and it lost its electoral cycle nature. This all directly affected the effectiveness of the project in the achievement of its objectives.

The round tables were largely implemented as designed although their length was doubled, from 30 minutes to about an hour. These were done twice a month for ten months before, during and after the elections and were broadcast twice monthly through the Killid radio network. An additional four round tables were done with Killid funding. These were intended to be live broadcasts with listeners able to call in, but only the two initial ones were done live, reportedly because of their 'hot topics'. According to the moderator, the remainder were recorded to edit out attacks against candidates. In a volatile electoral context editing for inflammatory language or hate speech is responsible journalism. But at the same time, the programmes lost the interactive element with the listeners.




Figure 1: Media products produced and broadcasted

The round tables seemed to have an appropriate mix of civil society organizations, government and politicians for debates on topics relevant to the project purposes. The moderator was a female reporter. No data is available for their reach, ratings or audience demographics. Anecdotally, the Killid radio staff in Kabul and in Mazar-el Sharif said many people would call into the radio stations when they were aired wanting to express their opinions on the topics discussed, not realizing they were pre-recorded. There were no mechanism to link these callers to the round table programming or to the other elements of the project, which could have increased the effectiveness and impact of the programme and project.



CSO workshop in Kandahar

Photo: DHSA

The PSAs started in the second round, initially concerned over the allegations of electoral problems and acceptance of the results, and later on the effects of the elections and whether citizen demands had been heard by the new government. Their length was also extended from one minute to 1.5 or 2+ minutes. Killid felt this extra time was needed to convey the message.

In general, they were scripted as concerns or hopes of Afghanis and how they thought things would get better from voting. At the end, the announcer makes the point of the PSA (text box). Dari and Pashto versions were each broadcast twice a day for two weeks.

This likely served as an effective radio tool providing a snap shot of the public mood and everyday concerns, and perhaps served as a reminder for government on the plight of the average Afghan. Effectiveness beyond that, for public information purposes, to build citizenship, or to monitor actual campaign pledges, is doubtful since they did not have this type of focus.

The nine investigative reports were also done after the second round and at the same time instead of the once a month reporting as intended in the design. Killid thought concentrating the reports within a shorter timeframe would be more effective. These were broadcast and published In January - March 2015 which was significantly after they were written.

PSA excerpt aired December 2014

Parwana: "I am in the sixth class... my mother tells me not to go out from home, that there is no security. But my father tells me the new president will bring peace and security to our life... we hope to be secure everywhere, then I with my classmates will pay and have picnic in parks and streets. God do it! There is no war after that.

Announcer: Days and moments have passed, waiting for the work of our new president. All waiting to dress up their promises and pledges to the practical and showable".

Killid provided the list of questions to reporters to ensure all nine reports covered the same topics. No reporting formats were given and the editing was done in Kabul, which in some cases required some back and forth. Most of the radio reports were done in Pashto with

Figure 2 Investigative Reports	
Provinces	Report
Herat, Ghor, Badghis	Presidential Poll: Voters in the West
Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, Oruzgan	Presidential Poll: Reading the mind of voters in East
Helmand, Farah, Nimroz	Taking ownership of transfer of power
Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar	Our vote, our choice in the northeast
National	Money matters more than leadership
Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Logar	Voting to make a difference in southeast
Balkh, Samangan, Jawzan, Sar-e-Pol, Faryab	Different ethnicities joined hands in the north
Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan	Pave the way for development
Bamyan, Daikundi, Ghazni, Maidan Wardak	Voting for a smooth transfer of power

some interviews in Dari. Two of the reports were done by Dari speakers, but their introductions and conclusions were also in done Pashto.

Report content followed along the lines of the PSAs, reporting on opinions on the problems in the elections. Some reporters did a paragraph or two of analysis and a few provided some voting statistics for the region. Most of those interviewed appeared to be men and there was no focus evident on ensuring the perspectives of women or youth were reflected.

“I respect CSOs, we need them, they are a source of information and they help us know other organizations. We are ready to cover them and their work. This is how we do business.”

Najiba Ayubi, DHS A DG

“Thanks to this project and its round tables, I met different civil society activities, that I have kept in contact with since the end of the project.”

Aria Ahmadzai, Round Table Moderator

The effectiveness of the reports beyond serving as another reporting format is doubtful. Among other issues, their delayed publication raises questions of continued relevance of the content in a rapidly evolving political situation where a negotiated solution to the electoral crisis resulted in significant changes to the government structure and the installation of a government of national unity. All of this affected the structure of power which was the purported focus for the reports.

Concentrating them within a shorter timeframe likely would have been more effective if they were done for PSA purposes, but having a series of reports over time would have been more useful for a monitoring and accountability tool as it then could follow the process and changes made- or not made- by the new officials and government. Nevertheless, significant effort was put into the development of the investigative reports by the participating journalists, all of which appeared to take their work extremely seriously and who did a substantial number of interviews in the three to four provinces assigned to them.

The reach of these reports is unknown. They were broadcast repeatedly in their timeframe, published in the magazines and posted on line in Dari, Pashto and English, but outside of global circulation and reach figures for Killid outlets, no information is available on their actual reach or use by listeners/readers. TKG says it also only has global statistics for its website so the number of views for the online versions posted is unknown. The three reporters interviewed for the evaluation had not heard the broadcast of their reports nor seen the published version.

There was an element of mentoring and training incorporated into the project design for participating local journalists and youth and women’s CSOs. Although no expenditures are noted in the Final Financial Report for this element, Killid said it held six workshops which it felt constituted this part of the project. The workshops were done extremely late in the project and were short one off efforts that likely achieved very little in terms of mentoring or training.

Figure 3
Workshops

Date	Location	Number participants	Workshop
23 Sept 2014	Herat	66 (36M/30F)	Killid-CSO meeting to agree on a Transparency and Accountability Campaign
30 Dec 2014	Kandahar	30 (25M/5F)	Demands and concerns of youths and women from new government and follow up of transparency and accountability
30 Dec 2014	Khost	29 (9M/10F)	Concerns and demands of youth and women from upcoming government
5 Jan 2015	Nangarhar	25 (20M/5F)	Concerns and demands of youth and women from upcoming government
3 Feb 2015	Kabul	8 CSOs 11 partic.	Transparency and Accountability Campaign (Milestone 3)
11 Feb 2015	Mazar-e-Sharif	16 (12M/4F)	Killid-CSO meeting to agree on a Transparency and Accountability Campaign

The first was done in Herat in September 2014 (Figure 3) through an agreement with a youth network NGO, Navid Social Development Organization (NSDO) which anticipated their organizing three such workshops. The contract was for a two day workshop but according to NSDO, the Killid portion was held on part of the second day of one of its quarterly meetings with members of its network. Although it was short, NSDO felt the workshop went well, with youth able to provide their perspectives and concerns. However, according to the Killid

project managers, the youth were too naïve to give ‘interesting opinions’ and they cancelled the remaining workshops.

Killid eventually organized another five workshops in late 2014 and early 2015 through its Kabul radio and provincial stations. It used its own CSO contacts and would ask its provincial station to find participants, and in one case, for the next day. The workshops seemed short - starting at around 10:00 am, breaking for lunch and ending around 14:00. According to participants, the first part was a presentation by Killid on their programming, and there was about an hour to work in groups on issues of concern which they then wrote on blackboard before the session ended.



Workshop in Khost

Photo: DHSA

Many of the participants interviewed said they were interested in the topics, especially in Mazar where they felt there were few workshops on these topics, but no follow ups were done. Memory of the workshop for others was extremely dim. The workshop held in Kabul appears to have been organized to serve as Milestone 3 instead of the broadcast of the first post-election investigative report as listed in the Project Document. According to Killid, it used the outputs of the workshops (the lists of topics raised by the participants on the concerns of women, youth and transparency and accountability) in its subsequent reporting.


(iii) Efficiency

The Killid Group has been broadcasting for many years and has trained journalists and station managers in place. DHSA and TKG have also had numerous international grants and contracts that should have ensured that appropriate project management and reporting systems were already in place. It had an existing radio network of seven stations and extended ties to another 28 that allowed it to quickly and cost-effectively share project media products and coordinate broadcasting. It is surprising then that it had delays in starting up this project and that many of the products were not started until six months or more into the project, which was originally intended as a one-year project. The reasons for this are not clear. The Project Document was signed on 10 December 2013 and TKG said the funds were received late. However, most of the project was to be implemented by TKG’s existing staff according to the budget, so planning for this project should not have been dependent on the actual receipt of funds.

TKG also felt the electoral stalemate after the second round interrupted the project. The people were in despair and this gave them a limited audience, and they were unsure how to proceed. Their products from this time reflected this mood. However, these types of political crises are the time to engage even more vigorously in the type of activities foreseen by the project, to focus citizen and candidate attention on the benefits in remaining with the democratic process, in letting the audit system work out its findings and in helping to reinforce the credibility of the ultimate resolution. This is much more efficient- and effective- in terms of project outcomes than waiting for a crisis to resolve.

The project budget was not consistent with the project’s intended outcomes. To achieve those higher level results, much more focus needed to be given to the civil society elements

of the project design and to the content of the media products. The budget had a heavy emphasis on the development of media products. Only 10 percent was allocated for the more programmatic elements of building a civil society - journalist network, mentoring, training and workshops. According to the Final Financial Report, the budget expenditures were made largely as outlined in the Project Document, except for that 10 percent. Only about one percent was reported as used for this effort with the remainder used for the media production and broadcasting efforts (Figure 4).



There was not enough expenditure detail to assess if it was consistent with an effective delivery of the outputs. It is hard to know how the output-based costs were calculated even using the more detailed budget in the Project Document. As an example, the five CSO workshops to collect and analyze information were expected to cost USD 23,000 for the pre-election meetings and USD 15,000 for the post-election meetings (USD 4,600 and USD 3,000 per meeting respectively). While in the line item budget, it is listed at USD 700 per meeting for seven meetings for both the pre-and

post-electoral periods. The reason for the vastly different amounts is unclear. Staffing and travel costs for the Kabul participants for these workshops were covered under different line items. The output based budget did include the cost for the workshop analysis but these reports were short two-three page reports that likely took less than an hour to do as they only provided the factual information on the meeting (location, date, participants, etc) and the bullet lists of topic titles raised in the meeting.

It is also unclear if the project primarily used existing staff. TKG sent the evaluators copies of 11 staff contracts issued for a year in March 2015 with a range of media responsibilities. There was no information provided on how many of these were existing staff or what percentage of their salaries were paid for by the grant.

Although the Chief Editor, who was partially paid for under the grant, felt there had been training and orientation on the project, this was not evident in interviews with radio staff or investigative journalists and the training line item remained unspent. Training on project objectives and performance reporting requirements could have increased efficiencies as well as helped to integrate the more programmatic elements. A more substantial engagement of CSOs in the project- as inherent in the design- could have also served this purpose and helped guide the project in times of electoral crisis, providing input on the types of messages that were needed for educational and participation purposes, and contributing to the electoral and accountability monitoring. There was also no evidence of marketing done for project activities in terms of banners, signs, written materials or publications¹⁸.

¹⁸ UDF-AFG-12-508, *Project Document*, Section 9.b.

TKG appears to have financial and administrative systems in place for its own operations. It produced copies of contracts of staff and airtime sheets for some of the broadcasts. But there appeared to be no system to aggregate project data beyond counting the number of outputs and any performance monitoring done was related to the quality of the journalistic product and not on the results of those outputs. As a result, reporting to UNDEF was general in nature. DHS/Killid did, provide at least two interim updates to UNDEF on the delays in implementation and changing the investigative reports broadcasting timeline. TKG stated



Workshop Khost on youth’s concerns and demands from the new government.

Photo: DHS

these reports were only for informational purposes as they perceived the changes as “technical” in nature and ones that did not require donor consent.

There was a large turnover of project managers (3) considering the short duration of the project. This likely contributed to delays in implementation and the lack of programmatic synergies between the different project elements. The Argentinean editor reviewed the PSAs and reports on English translations. The ones for the investigative reports were done in India as according to Killid, good translators were not available in Afghanistan. The efficiency of this arrangement is unknown but the process likely improved the journalistic quality of the products. The quality of the English translations for the PSAs (which were kept internal) was poor.

(iv) Impact

Results level data was not collected by the project, and almost no anecdotal information was available on the results of the project. The reach of TKG’s radio network is reportedly six to eight million people in 16 provinces, and the two magazines reach about 9,000 persons. So it is likely that this project:

- ***Increased listener awareness on certain topics discussed***, through listening to the radio round tables discussions, investigative reports and PSAs. Killid also does regular news reporting, which was supposed to be informed by the information gathered by CSOs. As there was limited interaction with CSOs within the parameters of this project beyond the monthly round table, the impact of those regular news reports cannot be attributed to this project.
- ***Extended TKGs reach to CSOs in some areas*** through the round tables and five provincial workshops. These brought in some CSOs that they said they had not previously corresponded with and which they seem to have maintained in contact with for their regular reporting purposes.
- ***Allowed TKG to do more in depth reports on the electoral process*** than it would have been able to do without the external funding. These types of investigative reports take time and resources which most media outlets in the Afghan context could

not afford without assistance. This in turn helped ***Killid to become more proactive in news creation than reactive*** which it felt was the norm in Afghanistan.

Impact beyond this is impossible to assess. The activities outside of the media products were not developed which makes the likelihood of impact minimal. For example, one of the participants in the workshop in Mazar was from the Afghan Human Rights Commission. She was extremely interested in the topics and wrote up an article after the workshop in anticipation of being asked to write something for a Killid publication or to be interviewed by them on the radio on some of these issues. But she was never contacted afterwards. This was a missed opportunity to get an independent commission engaged in the effort that could not only help with content for the informational and educational messages but with the monitoring of government accountability as well.

“The Afghan media played a constructive role in the presidential elections in 2014. Their pre-election products were concentrated directly on educating citizens and encouraging them to participate in the democratic process. They had this realization on their own, and this was unprecedented for Afghanistan.”


Abdullah Ahmadzai, TAF Director

“I think it was really important implementing this project. It sets a new approach, raises unusual questions, shows new paths for both media and CSOs. All this in the context of a work-in progress as it is with almost everything in Afghanistan, where the expectations of dramatic changes would lead to frustration. Patience and continuity within a clear development concept is the right path.”

Ricardo Grassi, TKG Editor-in-Chief

In addition to making efforts to collect performance data, the indicators selected need to be able to measure project progress towards the achievement of objectives, count more than outputs and be attributable to the project. Indicator 1.1 was a ten percent increase in voter turnout over a TAF 2012 survey on intention to vote in the next presidential election. Indicator 2.1 was an increase in women’s turnout without a target. Final project reporting provided little turnout data or analysis of whether this effort contributed to that change. This type of data is

Figure 5: Percentage of ballots cast by women in 2014 elections



Source: Afghanistan Election Data 2014

easily accessible through the IEC or other website (Figure 5). But turnout is also not a good indicator. It is affected by too many factors, including security and the efforts of many other organizations. So attribution for that to any one project is not usually possible.

Other indicators were not tracked, such as 1.4 “debate generated around issues related to the coming elections, and women and youth issues and participation” which was to be measured by media reaction and coverage of the Killid reports, etc. To report on this a monitoring and collection system needed to be put into place. This could have been done through TKG’s seven provincial stations.

Measuring increased awareness of a target group requires pre and post measurements of the target group on their

level of awareness on the particular topic and their level of participation. In this case, the TAF surveys offer a great opportunity for measurements as they are done annually and include a great many relevant questions that could be used. Or a project could make arrangements with TAF to add a couple of questions specific to project outcomes. But to be attributable to a project, the project itself has to target its messages towards those groups, which was only done marginally by this project.

(v) Sustainability

The project focused on the production and broadcasting of media products by an established radio group which continues to operate through donor funding, advertising and other revenues. Killid used primarily its own reporters and staff to implement the project. Assuming most of them stayed with TKG, any experience and knowledge gained under the project would remain with them and DHSA/Killid. Killid continues to use CSOs for information or as participants in some of its programming but many of those relationships appear to have predated the project. Doing the same type of in depth investigative reports is not sustainable without obtaining another sponsor since these require more dedicated resources.

IV. Conclusions

Based on the evaluation findings, the team concludes:

(i) The **project's intended outcomes and the delivery of impartial reports and educational messages on the democratic and electoral processes are important and needed in the context.** This is especially the case for voters in rural areas where the population receives less attention and information and who can be easily reached through radio. This conclusion follows the findings on relevance.

(ii) The **project focused on the production of journalistic products and its programmatic elements were not sufficiently developed, and in some cases were not done.** These were needed to achieve the higher level development outcomes sought by the project and turn the project from an elections-related media reporting project to a democratic development project. This conclusion follows the findings on relevance, effectiveness and impact.

(iii) The **media products reflected the mood of the country and were not sufficiently developed as tools that could strengthen the voice and participation of women and youth and ensure the accountability of elected officials** which were the primary objectives sought by the project. This conclusion follows the findings on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact.

(iv) The **electoral process and its problems might have contributed to issues encountered in project implementation, but there was significant need to strengthen project management and train project staff** on development projects in general and on the objectives of the project in particular. Especially on the rationale for the CSO elements that were woven into the project design, and on project performance monitoring and reporting systems beyond the production of a media product. This conclusion follows the findings on effectiveness, efficiency and impact.

(v) The **grantee made efforts to provide balanced programming in its round tables and reporting, but this was offset by the predominate use of Pashto** in some media products **and a focus on problems** in many of the media products. Language balance was especially important after the first round when the electoral campaign became polarized along ethnic lines. It also marginalized the majority Dari speaking population from the project and its benefits. The focus of many of the PSAs, investigative reports and workshops was also on problems rather than solutions. This conclusion follows the findings on relevance, effectiveness, impact.

The **project might have had more significant results than were visible** to the evaluation team, but **it is not possible to know as monitoring results beyond outputs were not tracked.** The project's monitoring and evaluation plan was output based and lacked the indicators and before/after measurements needed to better demonstrate its actual level of impact. This conclusion follows findings on efficiency and impact.

V. Recommendations

To strengthen similar projects in the future, the team recommends:

(i) For similar projects in the future, the evaluators recommend that the grantee ***gives more focus on ensuring project activities embody the project purpose and contribute more directly to the achievement of the project outcomes.*** This recommendation follows conclusions (i), (ii), (iii) and (v).

(ii) Project staff and reporters should be given ***a substantive orientation and training at the start of the project*** on the objectives of the project, on the project design and its performance reporting requirements so that they better understand the links between the activities, how and why these are done, the intended outcomes and how performance is measured. This recommendation follows conclusions (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi).

(iii) Projects should also ***strengthen their links with CSOs and other development organizations dealing with civic education, gender issues, the electoral process and democratization issues*** to ensure the more programmatic elements remain in the forefront of project implementation and to provide a mechanism to follow up of the issues identified in the reporting and to undertake the monitoring elements that go with advocacy. This recommendation follows conclusions (iv), (iii), (iv) and (v).

(iv) PSAs and other ***civic educational-type materials should be grounded in the national mood, but focused on constructive information*** and targeted on a campaign designed to achieve specific results to help listeners understand the situation, know what they need to do, and manage their post-electoral expectations. Among others, it needs to be clear that elections are only one part of the democratization process and cannot generate change by themselves. This recommendation follows conclusions (ii), (iii) and (v).

(v) Grantees should also ***ensure projects have a monitoring and evaluation system in place that uses appropriate indicators, tracks project performance and collects baseline and impact information*** so that the outcomes of project activities can be captured as well as their outputs. This information not only helps track project performance but can help better target content for PSAs, reporting, round tables and workshops. The conclusion follows conclusions (ii), (iii), (iv), and (vi).

VI. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

From a democratic development perspective, many aspects of the project were not developed as one would expect in a development project. They were present in the project design, but the implications of what this actually should entail beyond the production of media products, did not seem to be well understood. This is evident in the allocation of its project budget, and focus of its activities.

The grantee also thought making changes to the timeline for producing and airing media products were technical issues that did not affect the programmatic elements of the project. However, the project was designed as an interactive media-CSO electoral cycle project and doing most of it after the elections are over, or bunching activities towards the end of a project, or neglecting certain elements of the design, changes its nature. In this case, from an electoral cycle support programme to a post-election reporting project.

Nevertheless, the role of the independent media is an extremely important one in a transitional context such as Afghanistan and needs to be encouraged. As expressed in this PSA:

“Poverty, indigence, and poverty affect everyone in this society and they want the government to turn its attention to their life. The media is the spokesperson of the people in society, therefore, we make ourself responsible to transfer the people’s voice to the authorities. We hope that they will hear their voices and take a positive step for the betterment of their life.”¹⁹

¹⁹ PSA Spot No. 1.1, broadcast March 2015

VIII. ANNEXES

Annex 1: Evaluation questions:

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context? Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why? Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have the project's objectives been reached? To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not? Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives? What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs? Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability? Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address? Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative? To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization? Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact? Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc). Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?

Annex 2: Documents Reviewed:

Afghanistan on Line, *Languages, A look at the languages spoken in Afghanistan*, <http://www.afghanweb.com/language/>

Civil Society and Human Rights Organization, <http://www.cshrn.af/en/>

DHSA, About US, http://www.dhsa.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=37

DHSA, Distribution of Killid and Murad, 2015

DHSA/Killid, *PSA Scripts for December 2014 - March 2015*

DHSA/Killid, *Undated update letter to UNDEF*,

DHSA/Killid, *Undated update letter to UNDEF on programming for July-August 2014*

European Union Election Assessment Team, *Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Final Report, Presidential Election, 5 April and 14 June 2014*

Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press, Afghanistan*, 2014 <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/afghanistan#.Vec2617ltMs>

Samuel Hall Consulting, *Afghanistan's Future in Transition: A Participatory Assessment of the Afghan Youth* research commissioned by DMOYA, UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF, 2013

International IDEA, *Voter turnout data for Afghanistan*, <http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=4>
Development and Humanitarian Services for Afghanistan website, http://www.dhsa.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=43

The Killid Group website, <http://tkg.af/english/>

The Killid Group website on project: <http://tkg.af/english/component/content/article/50-elections-afghanistan/1726-elections-afghanistan>

The Killid Group, *Update from Project Manager to DHSA Finance Manager, dated 23 August 2014*

National Democratic Institute, *Afghanistan Elections Data*, <http://2014.afghanstanelectiondata.org/#election/turnout>

Research for a Better Afghanistan, *Governance in Afghanistan, An Introduction*, by Aarya Nijat, March 2014
<http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1402E-GOVERNANCE%20IN%20AFGHANISTAN.pdf>

The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2013, A Survey of the Afghan People*, Kabul 2013

The Killid Group, *Radio Killid*, <http://tkg.af/english/divisions/broadcasting/radio-killid>

The Killid Group, *Killid Weekly*, <http://tkg.af/english/divisions/publishing/killid-weekly>

The Killid Group, *Mursal Weekly*, <http://tkg.af/english/divisions/publishing/mursal-weekly>

UDF-AFG-12-508, *Involving women and youth CSOs in strengthening democratic debate and public news media around elections in Afghanistan*, Project Document, December 2013

UDF-AFG-12-508, *Involving women and youth CSOs in strengthening democratic debate and public news media around elections in Afghanistan*, Final Narrative Report, 11 May 2015

UDF-AFG-12-508, *Involving women and youth CSOs in strengthening democratic debate and public news media around elections in Afghanistan, Milestone 3 Report* , 2 February 2015

UDF-AFG-12-508, *Involving women and youth CSOs in strengthening democratic debate and public news media around elections in Afghanistan, Final Financial Report*, 15 June 2015,

UDF-AFG-12-508, *Involving women and youth CSOs in strengthening democratic debate and public news media around elections in Afghanistan, Project Officer's Note*, Undated

UDF-AFG-12-508, *Involving women and youth CSOs in strengthening democratic debate and public news media around elections in Afghanistan, Extension Form*, Undated

UDF-AFG-12-508, *Involving women and youth CSOs in strengthening democratic debate and public news media around elections in Afghanistan; Public Service Announcements Broadcasting Plans for December 2014, January - March 2015*

United States Institute of Peace, *Supporting Afghan Women in the 2014 Transition*, <http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/02/26/supporting-afghan-women-in-the-2014-transition>

Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

29 August 2015	
Rokhan	Finance Manager, DHSA, Kabul
Wesal Noori	PSA Production Manager, DHSA, Kabul
Hamidullah Kohistani	Head of Reporters, DHSA, Kabul
Ahmad Jaweed Jalali	Managing Director, DHSA, Kabul
30 August 2015	
Usman Khan	Programs Manager, DHSA, Kabul
Aria Ahmadzai	Round Table Moderator, Killid, Kabul
Muhammad Ajmal ARIA	Support Division Director, DHSA, Kabul
Mira Jan Jahed	Administration, Finance Manager (2014), DHSA, Kabul
31 August 2015	
Ebrahim Alokozay	Director, Navid Social Development Organization, Kabul
Amin Wardak	Journalist, Kabul
Najiba Ayubi	Director General, DHSA, Kabul
1 September 2015	
Eshaq Akrami	Journalist, Bamiyan, by phone
Mr. Ahmadzai	Country Director, TAF - Rescheduled because of delays in traffic and finding the office
Attaullah Wisa	Member of JAWANAN BARAI ESLAH VA TAGHEER Network, Kabul
2 September 2015	
Abdullah Ahmadzai	Country Representative, The Asia Foundation, Kabul
Sayed Eshaq Fahim MAQSUDI	Milestone No. 3 Verifier, UNDP Kabul by phone
Travel national consultant to Balkh	
3 September 2015	
Abdul Azim RESALAT	Executive Director, Civil Actors for Sustainable Development Organization(CASDO), Mazar
Abdul Qader MESBAH	President of New Line Social Organization (NLSO), Mazar
Sohail SABA	Journalist, Mazar
Firouz Mahbubi	Journalist for Azadi Radio, Kandahar (by phone)
Marzia	Member of WANTA, (Women's society), Mazar (by phone)
4 September 2015	
Najibullah	Hand In Hand, Mazar, by phone. Workshop participant
Shaista	WANTA, Mazar, by phone. Workshop participant
Mahmoud Mobarez	Killid Radio Manager in Mazar, by phone
Shah Mohammad Ayubi	Product manager in Radio Killid of Mazar, by phone
Allah Gul	Staff, Swedish Committee for <i>Afghanistan</i> , Mazar, by phone. Workshop participant
Nasir Ahmad	Station Manager of Radio Killid Mazar (during the project), Mazar, by phone
5 September 2015	
Return travel to Kabul	

Amin Joia	Student and Member of Youth Leaders Network, Herat, by phone. Workshop participant
Arsalam Ghory	Student, Member of Youth Leaders Network, Ghor, by phone. Workshop participant
Nafisa Azimi	Student, Member of Youth Leaders Network, Heart, by phone. Workshop participant
Wahida Najati	Member of Youth Leaders Network, Badgheis, by phone. Workshop participant
Haji Ahmad Shah	Community Centre for the Disabled, Kabul, by phone. Workshop participant
Shabnam Mansouri	Assistant, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, Kabul, by phone Workshop participant
Khumari Haidari	Deputy Assistant of Women's Rights Unit, AIHRC in Mazar, Mazar Sharif, by phone (workshop participant)
6 September 2015	
Ahmad Jaweed Jalali	Managing Director, DHSA, Kabul
Sayed Maqsod Hashimi	Project Manager, DHSA, Kabul
8 - 9 September 2015	
Shamid Samim	Workshop participant, AWEC, Kabul, by e-mail

Annex 4 : Acronyms

CSO	Civil Society Organization
DHSA	Development and Humanitarian Services for Afghanistan
EU	European Union
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSDO	Navid Social Development Organization
PSA	Public Service Announcement
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TKG	The Killid Group
UN	United Nations
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USD	United States Dollar