PROVISION FOR POST PROJECT EVALUATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY FUND
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EVALUATION REPORT

TRANSTEC

UDF-INS-09-323 - Empowering Civil Society Groups to Promote Social Accountability in Papua (Indonesia)

Date : 30 June 2014

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(i) Project data

The project *Empowering Civil Society Groups to Promote Social Accountability* was implemented between I April 2011 and 30 April, 2013 (including a one-month no-cost extension) by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)[1], based in Jakarta. The total grant was $225,000. The project was implemented by CSIS, with no implementing partners. In Jayapura, Papua, ICS, the Institute for Civic Strengthening, provided logistical support.

The project served the overall goal of securing improved governance in Papua. More specifically, it focused on developing and implementing a practical strategy to build a mechanism, a CSO Forum, through which civil society could develop skills in social accountability and promote accountability and transparency by the provincial and city government. In this way it would contribute to building "effective demand" for good governance.

Given the deep suspicion of civil society on the part of government in Papua (not unusual in a conflict zone), the intention of the project was to establish the CSO Forum as a legitimate body in the eyes of both decision-makers and the public. In pursuit of participatory governance, training was provided to all stakeholders, not only civil society organizations (CSOs), and a series of dialogue sessions was also organized.

(ii) Evaluation findings

Relevance: With its focus on the need to introduce mechanisms for social accountability into relations between civil society and local government, the project was directly relevant to the objective of addressing weaknesses in governance practice in Papua. However, gaps in initial baseline analysis and stakeholder consultations, along with a decision to implement the project without a local partner, reduced the closeness of its fit with the Papuan context and the needs of beneficiaries. While a local NGO was engaged to provide logistical support, it played no part in substantive discussions.

The project strategy was built around eight visits to Papua over a two-year period by members of the Jakarta-based project team. While project activities were planned and conducted in a highly professional way, limited opportunities for contact between the visiting team and beneficiaries, and a lack of continuity across activities, restricted what the project was able to accomplish.

Effectiveness: The project succeeded in delivering all outputs planned, but was less effective in achieving its intended outcomes. A key factor holding back the securing of project results was the over-estimation by the CSIS team of the level of interest of Papuan decision-makers in reform. This went along with a related assumption that middle-level officials could make commitments on behalf of the government.

Project activities were all well-focused on supporting the building of an awareness of social accountability among local officials, civil society leaders, journalists and academics in Papua.

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[1] Not to be confused with an organization of the same name, based in Washington DC.

However, the project strategy devoted insufficient attention to converting a new interest in social accountability into a commitment to sustain civil engagement and work to institutionalize mechanisms for accountability as a part of local governance practice.

A central feature of the project plan was the establishment of the CSO Forum as a focus for bringing together civil society groups with local government officials and elected representatives. As a result of the limited scope of initial stakeholder consultations, the experience of existing CSO networks in Papua was not taken into account. Despite this, the initiative by the project to set up the Forum to bring civil society organizations (CSOs) together and to provide an arena for dialogue between government and civil society was widely welcomed. Unfortunately, no effort was made to formalize the organization, structure and leadership of the Forum. It existed only when the project team was present in Jayapura and organized an event. Once the project finished, the Forum ceased to exist.

The project devoted much of its work to capacity development, seeking to increase the capacity of the CSO Forum, the local government and local parliament to promote social accountability. Most activities were relevant to this purpose, and the sequence of activities was planned logically to build awareness and understanding of social accountability on the part of Papuan CSOs, local officials and elected representatives, along with local academics and journalists. However, while individual activities were technically sound and well-received, the project lacked a clearly-defined strategy for capacity development, and did not result in the putting in place of sustainable knowledge and skills, except in the case of the introduction of the Citizens' Report card (CRC).

Despite the best efforts of CSIS, capacity cannot be built through lectures and question-and-answer sessions alone. Beyond this, it will be necessary to provide trainees or learners with opportunities to put what has been learned into practice and adapt new knowledge to the local context. These conditions were met with the introduction of the CRC. The project brought together local education officials, teachers and CSO members, and provided then with practical experience in planning the utilization of the CRC methodology in an educational pilot study, in selecting indicators and in assessing results. Consequently, the methodology was well-understood among by those involved, and a basis was laid for further work. Disappointingly, as with the CSO Forum, no plans for follow-up were made, and the gains made by the project may be wasted. Local officials made verbal commitments to set up a social accountability unit, adopting a model employed in local government elsewhere in Indonesia, but no action has followed.

Efficiency: The model of programming delivery that was adopted for the project revolved around eight intensive visits by members of the CSIS project team. This approach, which excluded partnership in project implementation with a Papua-based organization, and which made no allowance for continuity between team visits, resulted in certain inefficiencies. The project was well-managed, and, given the model adopted, was relatively efficient in its management of resources for the purpose of completing activities on time and working towards results. The project team worked extremely hard to make optimum use of its time on the ground in Jayapura and costs were reasonable. A small number of activities, including a national seminar in Jakarta and a study-tour to Australia, added little to project results and diverted resources which might have been better used elsewhere.

Impact: The Project succeeded in working in a constructive way to draw attention to deficiencies in governance in Papua, and contributed to building a broader awareness of social accountability and what it entails. Beyond this, its impact was quite limited. Despite this, there is potential for the project to have a catalytic effect. CSIS is a highly-credible, mainstream Indonesian policy research institution. As such, it is in a position to facilitate dialogue between government and civil society in Papua in a way that locally-based organizations might find more difficult. If it secures additional funding in the short term, learns from the lessons of this project and deepens its investment in seeking to strengthen governance in Papua, the UNDEF project would represent a beginning rather than an end.

Sustainability: It is apparent to the evaluators that the ideas concerning social accountability and its place in facilitating good governance presented and disseminated through the project found an interested audience in Papua. At the same time, what is less clear is whether the processes pioneered in the project, particularly the application of the Citizens' Report Card (CRC), have any staying power. Although a number of government officials indicated their desire to do more in utilizing the CRC, beyond the project, there has been no follow up. Similarly, none of the members of the CSO Forum have taken the initiative to continue to meet, or to establish the organization on a more formal basis. Without further external funding, and, at least initially, external facilitation, it is unlikely that the project will have succeeded in securing sustainable results.

(iii) Conclusions

▪ Surprisingly, in view of the awareness by CSIS of the complexity of local social, cultural and political dynamics, it made no provision in the project design for a partnership, or partnerships, with Papua-based organizations. All activities depended on the arrival of members of the CSIS team from Jakarta. This resulted in the absence of continuity across activities and a short-term approach to addressing major issues.

▪ The project's focus on accountability of local government to civil society was highly relevant to the broader problem of weak governance in Papua, which the project sought to address.

▪ The grantee's investment in initial baseline analysis and mapping of stakeholders, as well as of previous experience which might inform the project, was insufficient. Consequently, a number of core issues were not given the attention they deserved, while some prior initiatives, directly relevant to the project, were overlooked.

▪ The project team was focused and effective in ensuring that all activities were completed as planned, and carried out its program in a highly professional manner.

▪ There were deficiencies in the project's capacity development strategy. This was reflected in the lack of sufficient attention to what was required to establish the CSO Forum as a self-sustaining organization. Similarly, the practical and institutional requirements for putting in place a mechanism in local government to support social accountability on an ongoing basis were not addressed. More broadly, the workshops and dialogue sessions organized by the project, intended to build the capacity of Papuan stakeholders in social accountability were too

brief and short-term in duration, and proved inadequate as a basis for building sustainable knowledge and skills.

▪ One important area of success for the project concerned the introduction of the Citizens' Report Card (CRC) or "score card" as a technique for assessing the quality and reach of public services. The effort by CSIS to launch a pilot initiative in education in Jayapura was highly-regarded by participants, and stands out as an effective "learning-by-doing" approach to building capacity.

▪ As a result of a tendency by the project team to take an expression of interest on the part of stakeholders, particularly government officials, as a formal commitment to act, CSIS overestimated the project's achievements as assessed in relation to the five outcomes specified. While the project made worthwhile contributions in each outcome area, no sustainable results were obtained. There has been no follow-up action by either government or civil society to continue the project's work, and CSIS has made no further contact with project stakeholders.

▪ Project beneficiaries interviewed for the evaluation reported positively on the value of the ideas concerning social accountability introduced to them by the project. Yet, none of the elements of social accountability have been introduced into local government practice in Papua, and none of the members of the CSO Forum continue to pursue the accountability agenda, as promoted by the project. Without further investment and external organizational leadership and facilitation, there is little to suggest that the project will have a lasting impact.

▪ The project was generally well-managed and resources were handled efficiently, At the same time, there were a number of activities – including a national seminar in Jakarta, and a study-tour to Australia – which contributed little to results.

▪ CSIS is a highly competent policy research organization, but it seems to lack some of the core competencies required to enable it to translate ideas into changed governance practice. For the future, the Centre will benefit from adding to its team expertise in local government/public administration, the organization of civil society, and capacity development. If it is to continue to work in Papua, it must also find a way to build a partnership with local organizations. One interim approach would be to establish a Papua-based steering committee, to invest in building its capacity, and to share decision-making responsibilities with it.

▪ Since other Jakarta-based organizations will face similar problems to those encountered by CSIS in implementing projects and research programs in Papua, consideration might also be given to the development of a joint approach with other Indonesian institutions with a strong interest in the future of Papua and improved governance in the territory, whereby a small centre is established at a local university or college. The centre would then play the role of implementing partner in future projects, advise on local contextual dynamics, and provide an ongoing local presence for its sponsors, while also strengthening local capacities.

(iv) Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- CSIS reconsiders its approach to project design, with particular attention to including a comprehensive stakeholder mapping and project scoping exercise at the outset;

- CSIS ensures that it devotes attention to ensuring that senior decision-makers will provide the necessary level of support for proposed project results to provide a higher probability for their sustainability;

- In future projects in Papua, CSIS recognizes the necessity to maintain continuity of engagement with stakeholders by building a partnership with local organizations, perhaps through a steering committee. ***It is further recommended that*** consideration be given to developing a joint approach with other like-minded Indonesia-based institutions with a view to building up a small centre at a university or college in Papua to perform a role as implementing partner in future projects and research initiatives;
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- CSIS takes the necessary steps to build up its professional competencies in capacity development to strengthen the prospects for the sustainability of the results of future projects in Papua and elsewhere. ***It is further recommended that*** care is taken in ensuring that future projects are informed by a capacity development strategy well-adapted to the local context.

- CSIS considers broadening the professional base of its team for future work in Papua by adding expertise in: local government and public administration and civil society organizational development.

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II. INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

(i) The project and evaluation objectives

The project *Empowering Civil Society Groups to promote Social Accountability* was implemented between I April 2011 and 30 April, 2013 (including a one-month no-cost extension) by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)[2], an independent policy research institute, based in Jakarta. The total grant was $225,000, including $22,500 for UNDEF monitoring and evaluation. The project was implemented by CSIS, with no implementing partners. In Jayapura, Papua, ICS, the Institute for Civic Strengthening, provided logistical support.

The project served the overall goal of securing improved governance in Papua. More specifically, it focused on developing and implementing a practical strategy to build a mechanism, a CSO Forum, through which civil society could develop skills in social accountability and promote accountability and transparency by the provincial and city government. In this way it would contribute to building "effective demand" for good governance.

Given the deep suspicion of civil society on the part of government (not unusual in a conflict zone), the intention of the project was to establish the CSO Forum as a legitimate body in the eyes of both decision-makers and the public. In pursuit of participatory governance, training was provided to all stakeholders, not only civil society organizations (CSOs), and a series of dialogue sessions was also organized.

The project sought to contribute to its overall goal through achieving the following objectives:

- Empowering CSOs to promote social accountability[3];
- Improving the capacity of the CSO Forum, the provincial government and the provincial legislature in terms of accountability and good governance;
- Building civic engagement among the CSO Forum, the provincial government and the provincial legislature.

This evaluation belongs to a larger set of evaluations of UNDEF-funded projects from Rounds 2, 3 and 4. The purpose of these evaluations is to "contribute to a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project, which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved".[4]

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[2] Not to be confused with an organization of the same name, based in Washington DC.

[3] The Project Document defines *Social Accountability* as "An approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement".

[4] See: Operational Manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, page 6

(ii) Evaluation methodology

There were some rather prolonged initial difficulties in communications with the grantee. This led to some delays, and resulted, apparently, from a gap in correspondence concerning the evaluation and its purpose between UNDEF and CSIS. Following an exhaustive exchange of emails with the grantee, involving the Transtec Evaluation Manager, as well as both members of the evaluation team, planning for the field visit, in both Jakarta and Jayapura, was concluded satisfactorily.

Based on discussions involving the Transtec Evaluation Manager, the international and the national consultant and the grantee, it was agreed that the international and national consultant would divide their labour. It had been learned that international consultants require a special government permit, beyond the normal visa, to visit Papua. For this reason, and also because of the high cost of a return domestic flight and airport transfers to Papua, as well as local costs, it was agreed that the international consultant would work in Jakarta for the week, while – the security situation and practical arrangements permitting - the national consultant would travel to Jayapura late on Sunday, returning on Thursday, during the day.[5]

Prior to the mission, both consultants had reviewed basic documentation concerning the project, as well as some analytic and descriptive materials on the situation in Papua. Documentation on the project in English is limited. The Project Document and Final Report are clearly presented and provide a good overview of project strategy, a thorough listing of activities and an explanation of the results framework. However, details on the substance of activities in English are lacking, and the national consultant translated summaries of selected documents in Bahasa to fill the gap.

To support the Jayapura portion of the mission, the international consultant had prepared a field interview guide for the national consultant to use as a starting point in planning her interviews.

Following an initial meeting between the two consultants in Jakarta on Sunday, April 26, the national Consultant left for Jayapura, to begin a set of interviews the following morning, while the international consultant began a schedule of interviews and discussions with CSIS and project stakeholders in Jakarta on Monday, April 27. All went well with the implementation of the dual-mission plan, and the two consultants met, as planned, for a wrap-up and debriefing session on Thursday late afternoon and evening. That meeting was also used to finalize plans for reporting and filling any gaps in information necessary to the completion of the evaluation report.

The plan for the parallel meetings in Jayapura and Jakarta ensured that the consultants were able to meet with a representative group of project stakeholders and beneficiaries. However, there were additional costs associated with the plan, in addition to extra transportation costs. In the absence of the National Consultant from Jakarta, arrangements were made to recruit another well-qualified individual, to provide Interpreting and logistical support in Jakarta. In Jayapura, CSIS provided assistance in locating a capable and resourceful civil society representative to provide support in monitoring the local security situation, arranging meetings and in securing the services of a reliable driver. Given the lack of trust of outsiders, which is a feature of Papuan culture and society, without the services of the local organizer, it would have been impossible to arrange interviews. Even with this support, it was not always easy to persuade local participants to take part in interviews and discussions.

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[5] The Jayapura visit depended on security conditions, as well as appropriate arrangements for support on the ground, and flight connections which meshed with the overall schedule.

Key stakeholders and beneficiaries interviewed included the following:

- Members of the CSIS Project Team;
- Members of the CSO Forum in Jayapura;
- Other representatives of local civil society in Papua;
- Senior Papua-based academics;
- Provincial and local government officials and members of the local legislature (Jayapura);
- Experts on Papua who have participated in the project (Jakarta);
- Media representatives who have participated in project activities.

It had been hoped that it would be possible to meet with Central Government officials from the Papua Desk at one or two key departments and ministries in Jakarta. However, the two key officials were on official business outside Jakarta, and not in Papua. Hence, the evaluators were unable to meet with them. Disappointingly, representatives of the key civil society organization in Papua, the Institute for Civic Strengthening (ICS) were not available for an interview.[6] The complete list of persons interviewed is provided in Annex 3.

(iii) Development context

Papua is one of two provinces created from the former Dutch colonial territory of West Papua, one part of a larger island, the eastern section of which is occupied by the independent state of Papua-New Guinea. Integrated into Indonesia in controversial circumstances in 1969, its political situation, along with the social and economic needs of the indigenous population, have yet to be adequately addressed. Now that the long-running conflict in Aceh has been settled, the ongoing struggle in Papua makes it the most troubled and unstable region of Indonesia.

The Indonesian takeover was opposed by most indigenous Papuans (as in the former Portuguese territory of East Timor), and resistance and struggle, sometimes violent, have continued unabated since 1969. The campaign for autonomy has been repressed with severity by the Indonesian security forces (a continuing presence in Papua), and estimates of the number of those who have been killed in the conflict range from 100,000 to 500,000.[7]

The economy of the region is built on resource extraction, including timber, the world's largest gold mine (the Grasberg Mine) and its third-largest copper mine. Yet the benefits of resource wealth have not been shared by the local population, either in terms of employment or social services. The human development index figures for Papua place it at the bottom of the rankings for Indonesia. Rates for infant mortality are the highest and health, literacy and education ratings are at the lowest level. Approximately 45 per cent of the population is 0-18 years of age; there is an absence of quality secondary education, while there are also extremely limited opportunities for young people to find steady or safe employment (UNICEF 2011).

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[6] It is apparent that the refusal to take part in interviews was not a response to the project, per se, but rather a consequence of a tense relationship between the head of ICS and the Governor of Papua, and pressure on the ICS representative to maintain a low profile.
[7] See: *Asia's Palestine? West Papua's Independence Struggle*. The Diplomat (US), 7 November, 2013.

Irian Jaya (now Papua) and Indonesia, and with PNG, below

In 2001, the Special Autonomy Act No. 21 was introduced. With its adoption, the Government of Indonesia indicated its determination to build trust among the local population, to emphasize inclusive economic development and ensure benefits for indigenous Papuans. Yet the expectations aroused by the adoption of the Act have not been met, and the sense of grievance towards the Indonesian state has grown. A harsh security policy and rent-seeking by local and national elites, as well as by the security forces, have undermined prospects for building a better

relationship between state and people. The provincial government and legislature have been ineffective, and where the central government seeks to introduce positive reforms, it lacks an active and engaged local partner.[8] Social divisions within Papua run deep: between the "mountain people", who are the poorest sector of the population, but who dominate Papuan politics, and the "coastal people", who have fared better economically; and, between both and the culturally and religiously distinct "settler" population from Java, who are the major players in small business, cash crop agriculture and other elements of local enterprise.[9]

As noted in the Project Document, governance In Papua has been weak, and lacking in both transparency and citizen participation, and, hence, unresponsive to the needs of the local population. Decision-making takes place on a "top-down" basis and levels of corruption are high.

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[8] See: *Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua*. International Crisis Group, Asia Report 232, 9 August, 2012.
[9] For a discussion of social divisions, see "The Roots of Conflict in Papua", Chapter 2 in Securitization in Papua: the Implications of the Security Approach towards Human Rights Conditions in Papua. Jakarta: Imparsial, 2011,

There is a long list of structural problems underlying the deficiencies in the governance of Papua, which is characterized by arbitrary decision-making and a disregard for formal and transparent decision-making processes. Powerful national and local interests would seem to have little incentive to introduce serious reforms. However, one of the factors which permits this state of affairs to persist is the weak engagement of civil society with provincial and municipal governance processes, and, hence the absence of "effective demand" for good governance in Papua.

III. PROJECT STRATEGY

i. Project strategy and approach

CSIS designed the project on the basis of its general experience in policy-oriented research and 10 years of previous research work in Papua, including three donor-funded projects on related topics, one of which had been funded by UNDEF.[10] Within the Institute, there are six researchers with an interest in Papua; four members of the group constituted the project team, along with one additional researcher/trainer, and were responsible for leading most of the activities which took place.

The team leaders explained that the project was designed with an understanding of the complexity of the situation in Papua, and in light of the recognition that many policy initiatives there had failed by taking insufficient account of local conditions and political dynamics. Based on CSIS' analysis of such difficulties, a decision was made to focus the problem of weak governance and the absence of mechanisms through which Papuan residents might hold their governments to account. It was understood that, with the exclusion of security matters, most of the programs of concern to local communities were the responsibility of the provincial and local/municipal governments. Hence, the project focused its efforts at the local level.

The earlier UNDEF-funded project, which took place in a relatively remote location, was built on the understanding of the importance of the role civil society could play as a partner in governance and in contributing to conflict resolution at local level. However, one of the lessons learned by CSIS from the previous project was that it was necessary to find ways to address in project design the fragmentation of groups in local society and politics, as well as the distrust which prevailed, even within civil society. Accordingly, in planning the second project, which carries forward many of the same themes, the project team made efforts to build broad support for the project initiative among key stakeholders in both Jayapura and Jakarta. It also decided to focus the project on the capital, Jayapura, rather than on a more isolated centre, as before. In terms of substantive content a more specific focus was given to the role of civil society in developing constructive and consensual approaches to accountability of government for its performance in meeting stated objectives.

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[10] The project, which took place in 2007-8, was entitled *"Empowering Civil Society towards Participatory Governance" (the project number ?)*supported the Jayawijaya Brotherhood Forum in enhancing civil society empowerment. See: http://dyahmutiarin.staff.umy.ac.id/files/2012/02/Int-Seminar-UNS-Civil-Society-Empowerment-And-The-Role-Of-International-Donor.pdf

There were five project outcomes, listed below, along with major activities relating to their achievement:

- The establishment of a CSO Forum, with a high degree of commitment in promoting social accountability (*N.B. the emphasis on the establishment of a representative civil society association was a continuation of an approach pioneered by CSIS in the earlier UNDEF project*):

  - Experts meeting in Jakarta on governance in Papua, to draw the attention of national policy-makers;
  - A series of meetings in Jayapura, Papua, with key governance stakeholders to build commitment to the project and its objectives;
  - Establishment of the Forum and public dialogue with stakeholders (through a meeting with 70 participants) on issues concerning social accountability;
  - Collaboration with a national TV station to produce a video report on social accountability to be distributed to, and viewed by, audiences in schools, universities, NGOs and government offices;

- Increased capacity of the CSO Forum, local government and local parliament to promote social accountability:

  - A 2-day training workshop for the CSO Forum, plus government officials and elected representatives on technical aspects of good governance and social accountability {SA} (25 participants);
  - A workshop of the CSO Forum, along with government officials and elected representatives, with selected members of groups representing women and other vulnerable groups, intended to "capture the voice and needs of gender and vulnerable groups" (30 participants);
  - A study tour to Australia to study best practice on SA by 2 CSIS researchers and I representative of the CSO Forum;
  - A 2-day workshop for 25 participants to design SA strategies for members of the CSO Forum, plus government officials and elected representatives;
  - Workshop on design and implementation of an SA Score Card and establishment of an SA Service Unit (UPIK), involving the usual participants in Papua-based project activities; the workshop was to be led by the CSO Forum with the support of CSIS (25 participants: 15 from CSOs, 5 from local government and 5 elected representatives);

- Increased commitment by the Papua Provincial and Local Government and Parliament to institutionalization and internalization of social accountability:

  - Preparation of an academic paper to explain the rationale for the emphasis on SA; the paper would be submitted to government and the parliament;
  - Workshop on Score-Card results, UPIK and the academic paper in Jayapura, for 20 participants, drawn from the CSO Forum and other core stakeholders, plus academics;

- Ongoing civic engagement among the CSO Forum local government and local parliament to sustain social accountability:

    - Workshop on establishing a future agenda for the Score Card, UPIK and radio and TV shows on SA (participants as for previously-listed workshop, but 30 in number on this occasion);
    - Radio talk show and TV talk show, with participation by experts and a call-in for the radio show;

- Public outreach to ensure increased awareness on social accountability at national and provincial level ("Dissemination Stage"):

    - A provincial seminar in Jayapura for the provincial government, local government, elected representatives, media, donors, NGOs, CSOs and academics (50 participants);
    - A national seminar in Jakarta for: officials from the Papua Desk of several relevant government departments, parliament, the media, donors, NGOs, CSOs and academics.
    - Publication of the findings of the project in a book or monograph; publication of SA materials on the CSIS website, along with the findings of the project.

The initial phase of the project was described as a foundation and training needs assessment in Papua. First, attention was given to what was a regular feature of the CSIS approach in its policy work "commitment building", a brief series of 1-on-1 meetings with local officials and CSO representatives, as well as academics and media personnel, to establish trust, mutual understanding and local ownership for the initiative. It was intended that the leaders of the 4 or 5 CSOs with whom meetings were held would be the key members of the CSO Forum and the "drivers of the process."

The list of activities included in the project was comprehensive, but a limitation of the design was the absence of a local partner, responsible for more than logistics and working to facilitate participation of stakeholders. The role of ICS, the Institute for Civic Strengthening in Jayapura, was somewhat vague. While valued by CSIS for its local knowledge, it did not play a role in project planning, and did so only marginally in substantive matters. Consequently, all activities depended on the presence of members of the CSIs team, and the project in Papua came to a halt when they left.

Travel to Jayapura from Jakarta is not easy and is relatively costly. Typically, for each visit, 2 or 3 members of the project team would travel to Papua for 5 working days in support of activities. There were 8 such visits in the course of a two-year project. It may be the case that there was no suitably-qualified local partner, but, in any case, this aspect of project design resulted in a lack of continuity for the project between visits, while the absence of a local partner meant that there was no opportunity to follow-up with local stakeholders to strengthen ownership, or troubleshoot, on a regular basis.

A number of critical assumptions were made and set out in the Project Document about: consensus-building among local stakeholders; the level of interest among CSOs in the CSO Forum; the level of capacity that might be built through the project on social accountability; and, the achievement of increased commitment from the local governments and legislatures to

institutionalize social accountability, particularly as a result of the practical exposure to the Score Card and its potential. It is apparent that CSIS was somewhat optimistic in setting these assumptions. In fact, many of them would have been better seen as part of the project, building the enabling environment for the project proper. As CSIS recognized at the conclusion of the project, two years is too short a time to generate complex changes in institutional practice and in inter-group dynamics. Particularly given the "fly-in, fly-out" nature of the project inputs, the project design, though technically and professionally solid on an activity-by-activity basis, underestimated the time and effort required at each stage, as well as the importance of building connections across activities.

ii.   Logical framework

The chart is based on detailed information included in the project's framework, as set out in the project Document, as well as the final report. In addition to listing a set of five intended outcomes, the project presents three objectives. To avoid overlap, and to make for a more straightforward presentation, these objectives have been taken as representing the medium-term impact results statements in the framework.

Project activities	Intended outputs/outcomes	Medium-term impacts	Long-term development objective
10 experts on Papua from the central government, major research institution, CSOs and the UN are invited to expert meeting; *Intensive communications by CSIS; with CSOs and government stakeholders, prior to initial visit to Jayapura* *Meetings with key stakeholders in Jayapura* *Invitations issued to 70 stakeholders to take part in meeting to establish CSO Forum and present idea of Social Accountability and how to put the concept into practice*	*Training Needs Assessment and Baseline Study completed:* **Expert meeting in Jakarta provided advice on governance and viability of social accountability approach, as proposed for project by CSIS. The meeting was attended by 6 of the 10 invited experts, plus 5 from CSIS;** **"Commitment-building" process in Papua completed:10 meetings held With key stakeholders, all indicated that they would participate In CSO Forum;** **Public Dialogue with 70 representatives from CSOs, local government and academics to formalize CSO Forum and introduce Social Accountability: 15 from CSOs, (of 35 invited), 5 academics (of 15 invited), and 10 of 20 local government staff attend; agreement reached on forming CSO Forum with focus on social accountability.** *Preparations for Implementing Social Accountability Plan & Score Card Initiative:* **Production & Distribution of brochure & posters on social accountability;**	**1. Establishment of CSO Forum that has a high degree of commitment to promote social accountability.**	
Design and printing of posters; planning with CSO Forum & government officials on		**2. Increased capacity of CSO Forum, local government and**	**Empowerment of Civil Society in Papua to promote social**

distribution *Project team visits schools and local government agencies*	**Visits to schools and public agencies to promote social accountability: Visits take place with 5 schools and 3 government agencies;**	local parliament in promoting social accountability.	accountability and hold the government more accountable to the public, thus improving good governance.
Contacts established with local TV station *Planning format & substance of video & distribution priorities with "strategic stakeholders"; Preparing logistics for production, recruitment of reporter and TV crew and arranging their travel to Papua.*	**Production of video documentary on DVD as awareness-building and learning tool re: social accountability; Production completed successfully, & 50 copies of DVD distributed.**		
Development of training modules, methodology and training plan for training on social accountability; Selection of participants	**2-day training course conducted for 25 participants**		
Seeking input from Women's organizations and vulnerable groups; identification of participants; organizing a meeting	**Conducting a meeting with women and vulnerable groups: 18 participants, mainly women market traders, met with the project team. The team introduced the concepts of advocacy and accountability; Issues of concern were raised by the women, and a city council representative responded.**		
A study tour to Australia for 2 members of the CSIS team and I from ICS, Papua, was planned	**Study tour to Melbourne and Sydney completed**		
Design options on strategies for implementing social accountability measures; develop plan for workshop; invite 22 participants from CSO Forum, government officials and local elected representatives	**Conducting a workshop on "Crafting Strategy on Social Accountability"; workshop took place with 22 participants; agreement arrived at on adoption of Citizen Report Card (CRC) as a means to pilot social accountability**		
Planning workshop with a focus on education sector; design format for UPIK and indicators for assessment & evaluation; inviting 25 participants	**Conducting a workshop on designing & Implementing CRC and initiating Social Accountability Service Unit (UPIK); workshop took place, 30 participants; review of questions for score card; training for a 10-member survey team; plan for a sampling of schools and students, drawing from 10 junior high schools (100 students selected as respondents); plan for forming assessment group to assess completed score cards.** **Workshop held, with CSIS team, CSOs and teachers (25 participants); score card results compiled**		
Plan for workshop to assess Score Card	**Workshop on presentation of Score-Card**		

Plan for workshop on presenting Score-Card results, establishment of UPIK and preparation of academic paper to be presented; inviting 20 participants	**results conducted; workshop took place, with 38 participants; presentations on importance of social accountability in Papua, on the education services in Papua, the CRC initiative, the results & their implications. Deputy Mayor of Jayapura made a commitment to support further CRC initiatives, but UPIK not formed. Academic paper distributed to local parliaments and local government.** **Workshop on Sustaining Social Accountability conducted, 35 participants; recommendations on expanding application of CRC in education, but also in health, and in other areas of Papua;**	
Plan for workshop on setting future agenda for sustainability of Social Accountability mechanism (score card, UPIK, radio & TV talk shows(; inviting 30 participants	**Production and Broadcast of Radio and TV Shows; Radio show (panel & interactive phone-in) broadcast on Republic Indonesia Radio (RRI), Jayapura in April 2013; TV show broadcast on TVRI Jayapura (state TV) in April 2013**	
Develop scripts for TV and radio shows; identify resource persons	**Conducting Provincial Seminar on Social Accountability; seminar held with 80 participants; presentations on summary of project and CRC process, plan for development of education in Papua, and social basis of social accountability; seminar results were documented.**	**3. Enhanced civic engagement to sustain social accountability**
Planning of Provincial Seminar; identification of speakers and participants; preparing plan for seminar; invitations to 50 participants	**Seminar held, entitled "Identifying a Comprehensive Solution to Strengthened Local Governance in Papua"; 50 participants, including senior central government representatives concerned with Papua.**	
Planning National Seminar on Social Accountability in Jakarta; identification of speakers; invitations to 50 participants		

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The evaluation is based on a framework reflecting a core set of evaluation questions formulated to meet the evaluation criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The questions and sub-questions are listed in Annex 1 of this document.

(i) Relevance

The project was certainly relevant in its focus on the need to address the absence of accountability mechanisms in Papua. It was also realistic in its decision to focus on the "local level", where barriers to change are likely to be less formidable. However, there is vagueness throughout the project on whether the focus should be on provincial or municipal/local level institutions and decisions-making. Based on the previous experience of CSIS in Papua, the recognition of the desirability of building and nurturing a CSO alliance, as a means of building trust and a sense of shared purpose, was important. However, for all this, there was a gap between what would be required to achieve project objectives, on the one hand, and project practice, on the other.

The sequence of activities and the technical content seemed to be well-planned to respond to the apparent needs of local beneficiaries. At the same time, it is not so clear that the overall project strategy was crafted to fit with a local context where difficult inter-group relations, an absence of trust among stakeholders in the governance of Papua, and a sheer lack of interest on the part of government decision-makers, made it a challenge for the grantee to obtain the level of buy-in necessary to enable the project to meet its objectives. While risks arising from these factors were noted, they were not taken into account to a sufficient degree in planning the project's strategy.

The initial baseline research and scoping of the project lacked the necessary input of local knowledge to enable it to adapt its plans as well as it might have done to the local context and local possibilities by drawing on the experience of those with whom it worked. In the discussion of Baseline Data in the Final Report (p.4), CSIS explains that it discovered that there were no CSO groups or NGOs in Papua dealing with issues relating to social accountability. In fact, several of those interviewed for the evaluation advised the evaluators of their own involvement in a well-established network dealing with similar topics.

The Papuan Transparency Alliance (ATAP) is supported by AUSAID and coordinated by PATTIRO, an Indonesian national NGO, based in Jakarta, which focuses on transparency in public policy and decision-making. It is reported to be well-organized, with a formal mandate and structure, and is based on a formal agreement signed by member CSOs. The structure and character of ATAP contrasts strongly with that of the CSO Forum, which existed without a formally-adopted mandate or structure and without any written commitment by member organizations. The failure to learn about the prior existence of ATAP and to seek to cooperate with it and learn from the network's experience imposed a serious limitation on the relevance of what CSIS was able to bring to addressing "the governance problem" in Papua.

Similarly, the evaluators learned that at least one or two of the CSOs involved in the project had substantial experience in finding ways to work with both the provincial and local government on practical, governance issues in what was regarded by the government counterparts as a constructive manner. The project would have done well to listen to accounts of such experience in designing the project and also in informing its own approaches to government officials. Once again, there was an opportunity lost in obtaining local knowledge which could have assisted greatly in devising project strategy.

It is quite apparent that it is difficult for any external organization to operate effectively in Papua. The absence of a local base of operations, or trusted local partner organization, along with the restriction on the project team's engagement to a set of 5-day missions from Jakarta, all represented major constraints to the adoption of an appropriate and effective approach. Project activities were well-designed, but, overall, the scarcity of contact time between the project team and beneficiaries within the parameters of a two-year project limited severely what the project was able to accomplish.

The project made considerable efforts to adapt the project design in the course of implementation, and is to be commended for its ability to identify opportunities to demonstrate the potential of social accountability mechanisms (for example, in using the score card with a sample of junior high school students and their parents, and training university students to interview them, as a means of assessing the quality of educational services). In this case, and others, it made good use of ad hoc consultations with immediate stakeholders to refine its approach. In the end, the strategy proved effective as a first stage, a piloting of ideas and approaches to social accountability, and of "learning by doing".

A more careful and thorough scoping of the project and an extension of preliminary analysis and confidence-building at the beginning, along with some arrangement to enable the project to have a continuing presence on the ground, maintaining regular contacts with stakeholders and building on completed activities, would have offered a greater prospect of achieving project objectives. To qualify this judgment, it must be acknowledged that CSIS found itself obliged to work with a limited budget, limited time and the difficulties of identifying a suitably qualified Papua-based partner. Pressure to get things done within the limited time available on the

Commitment-Building with CSO Representatives in August 2011

ground in Jayapura may well have contributed to the rather limited number on stakeholders consulted. For all this, with its substantial local experience, it is the view of the evaluators that, even within these constraints, CSIS might have adopted a more incremental strategy, where

more attention was given to ensuring that the building blocks were in place at each step in the process to allow the next stage to begin on a sound foundation.

(ii)Effectiveness

The project was diligent in ensuring that all outputs were delivered as planned, with minor adjustments. However, its ability to achieve the intended outcomes was more limited. Crucially, it is apparent that CSIS failed to come to terms with both the limited interest in reform of provincial government leaders in Papua - who favoured a top-down approach to decision-making - as well as the difficulties to be encountered in ensuring consistent involvement by Papuan civil society. The initial "training needs assessment" and "confidence-building" stages of the project were too limited in scope, with only a very small number of stakeholders being consulted, while other aspects of the project required more detailed preparation and mobilization of support to be fully effective. Further, it is the view of the evaluators that the project team failed to address through its implementation strategy what would be required to transform interest on the part of beneficiaries into an ongoing commitment to sustain engagement in support of social accountability.

The setting-up and operation of the CSO Forum (*Outcome 1*) was crucial to the project's success, since it was expected to be the foundation for sustained engagement of civil society with government in support of social accountability. The project's initiative in establishing the Forum was widely welcomed by participants and its place in both bringing together civil society organizations (CSOs) and in facilitating dialogue between government and CSOs was viewed as of some importance. Yet, there were critical weaknesses in the foundations on which the Forum was established.

After an initial stage of 10 meetings with individual stakeholders in the course of the "commitment building stage" of the project, on the basis of statements of interest by those with whom the project team met, CSIS pronounced that the Forum had been established. In practice, matters were less clear.

The evaluators found that those interviewed for the evaluation in Jayapura, most of whom were identified by CSIS as key stakeholders, were either unsure as to whether they were members of the Forum or not, and/or on whether the body continues to exist. In any case, it is now clear that, with the formal closing of the project, the Forum disappeared. Certainly, those identified by CSIS as members were actively involved in several project events and indicated an interest in social accountability, but that level of interest has not translated into ongoing engagement in work based on the ideas championed by CSIS through the project, or in continuing cooperation among stakeholders.

The vagueness about the role and functioning of the Forum among project participants is striking. Most believe that its establishment was a good idea, but, as an organization, the CSO Forum never became a visible actor in public dialogue or civic engagement. No formal documents were prepared to describe the Forum's mandate, structure and organization, or to spell out conditions for membership. Those who were viewed as members were not asked to sign membership forms. There was no process for selecting or appointing Forum officers, or to establish a steering committee.

.Activities took place when the CSIS team arrived in Papua and ceased when they left. A critical factor in explaining the weakness of the CSO Forum as an organization was the lack of clarity about the role of ICS, the organizing partner or agent of CSIS in Jayapura, and the lack of leadership it displayed, or was empowered (by CSIS) to display. Without a firm mandate and formal structure, and lacking consistent and ongoing organizational coordination, the Forum was unable to achieve its potential.

Moving from consideration of the Forum and its role to a broader assessment of the project's effectiveness in capacity building (*Outcome 2*), it is noted that the project sought to increase the capacity of the CSO Forum, the local government and local parliament to promoted social accountability. It is certainly the case that the project team displayed great energy in delivering a set of activities intended to produce this result. However, the sequence of activities, while logically planned in building awareness and understanding of social accountability and what it entailed on the part of Papuan CSOs, local officials and elected representatives, along with local academics and journalists, was not informed by a well-defined capacity development strategy. Consequently, while the project certainly managed to build an enhanced awareness of social accountability, it did not result in significant built capacity, except in one area: the utilization of the Citizens' Report card (CRC).

Capacity is not built through lectures and question-and-answer sessions alone. Beyond this, it will be necessary to engage learners by providing opportunities for them to put into practice what is learned and for making decisions about adapting knowledge acquired to fit with local circumstances.

This set of conditions was met in the case of the introduction of the CRC. Involving local education officials, teachers and CSO members in the score card planning and selection of indicators, as well as in the assessment of results, provided the necessary element of hands-on experience to ensure that the new methodology was both well-understood and "owned" by the participants. However, even in this case, failure to build on the experience and to ensure follow-up in carrying on the work is likely to diminish prospects for retention of the capacity built, or for ongoing collaboration among the stakeholders who took part in the exercise.

The claims made in the Final Report (Discussion of Outcome 2, p. 27) that local stakeholders "are actively involved in the initiation of CRCs and (the) Social Accountability Service Unit for compliance and information" are not supportable. It is true that local

Participants in Public Dialogue, Jayapura, November 2011

capacities to understand the ideas of social accountability, and to be able to identify some of the low-level barriers to good governance, have increased. It is also the case that a number of core participants have expressed their interest in continuing the work. However, to express interest is not an indication of commitment to act, and no follow-up to the initiatives piloted by the project has taken place.

A verbal statement of intent to establish the UPIK (Unit Pelayanan Informasi dan Keluhan or "Social Accountability Working Unit") was made by city officials at a public meeting organized by the project. However, no action has followed. Units of this kind have been established and function successfully elsewhere in Indonesia, for example, in Yogyakarta.[11] The project would have done well to learn from this practice, and to gain an appreciation of the procedures which might be required to establish the UPIK. It would also have been helpful to bring in a practitioner from a working unit in Java to discuss his/her experience with local government officials and CSO representatives in Jayapura.

Governance in Papua is a heavily hierarchical and top-down process. While middle-ranking officials may have an interest in taking cautious steps to work more closely with civil society organizations to facilitate more effective and responsive governance, unless they can obtain the buy-in of their superiors, nothing will change. As noted earlier, some of the CSOs which took part in the project have experience in finding practical ways through which to cooperate with government. It is surprising that the project made no attempt to learn from them. It would also have been well-advised to assess at the beginning of the project whether it could obtain support from higher-level officials for the project and its objectives. The local State Secretary took part in the Provincial Seminar, towards the end of the project, but this was a "no cost" appearance, in that no concrete commitment was made by the government to build on the project's efforts. Hence, it is difficult to accept the project's claim that it resulted in "increased commitment by the Papua Provincial and local government and parliament to institutionalized and internalized social

> **A Papuan Civil Society Member's Perspective on the Strengths and Weaknesses of the CSIS Project:**
> According to Mr. Hans Kaiwai, Economics Lecturer at Cenderwasih University, Jayapura, **the project was valuable** in providing opportunities for community inputs on governance: "In some of its activities, like workshops, talk shows and dialogues, there were always sessions asking for community responses. This is very good. What we then need is to intensify this. The main constraint is clearly related to financial support…CRC is actually a simple tool, which we could conduct independently to be a mirror of public service. A mirror will not tell a lie! At least, if this is part of local government's program, as in education or health, this will be a good mode of policy feedback to let them know about the level of citizens' satisfaction towards public service."
>
> In terms of **the project's limitations**, Mr. Kaiwai reflected that "the CSO Forum was relatively effective as an approach…(But, although) "there were representatives from the Local Development Planning Board and city council at meetings in the project, but this means nothing unless it (social accountability) is included in their planning and policy implementation…The project should have stayed longer. It had not been so deep, but had to be finished immediately. If it lasted longer, there would be more people to embrace and be influenced…encouraging CSO Forum is urgently needed.., the project would be welcomed if it continued with a deeper focus on the education and health sectors."

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[11] Source: Information from briefing report, prepared by National Consultant.

accountability" (Outcome 3, p. 27, Final Report).

Outcome 4: CSIS suggested in the Final Report that "It assesses that…through this project, civic engagement between the CSO Forum, local government and local parliament to sustain social accountability has been achieved." Many of those interviewed for the evaluation gave credit to the project for its efforts to stimulate public dialogue and engagement between government officials and civil society. At the same time, it was also recognized that the level of commitment to maintaining such engagement by public officials, including elected representatives, was weak and short-term. Hence, while the project may certainly claim to have made a valuable contribution in nurturing civic engagement, beyond, this, it cannot be demonstrated that longer-term results have been accomplished in institutionalizing such a process.

If, in the near term, CSIS manages to develop a follow-up initiative to carry on from where the UNDEF project ended, there may well be something to build on. However, it will take sustained institutional support for a few practical activities, focusing on improving administration and the quality of service provision, to take the accountability agenda forward.

The project's *fifth outcome* dealt with Public Outreach and increased awareness of Social Accountability at national and local level. CSIS proposes that, through the project, "social accountability is now widely known and understood in Papua." The evaluation found that the project's outreach activities were well-organized and broadly-based. There was considerable media coverage of the public events held in Papua, while the project itself invested in production of a DVD to introduce and explain social accountability, as well as TV and radio talk and phone-in shows. However, all such initiatives were "one-offs". While the project is likely to have brought a sizeable audience of educated Papuans into contact with ideas of social accountability, it is improbable that the public outreach activities will have been sufficient to make a lasting impression. As to increasing awareness at the

A Papuan Government Official, Speaking as an Individual, and not as a Government Spokesperson, On the Need for the Project, its Limits and the Hope for Further Engagement:

"What was most important was "a transparent discussion between the government and NGOs, when we share our ideas in the forum…the idea of how to evaluate public service was very good. However, as the evaluation (score card0 has not been used again, I think it has not had a good result…"

Did CSIS understand the challenges of governance in Papua?
"I think they understood well. However, as the time for sharing (in workshops and dialogue sessions) was very short, two hours per session, they (the CSO members and government officials) did not absorb the meaning (of social accountability) yet. Workshops should be conducted for full days, because people need more time to feel comfortable with one another and to open up on what they are thinking."

What did you think about CSIS's approach to the project?
"Collecting the government and CSOs in one forum is good, but the capacity building has not yet been very optimal. This is a common problem; the program was conducted and then finished…meanwhile, what is needed is a change in mindset and capacity building so that we can continue without their assistance. ..There is a need for NGOs to continue to evaluate and give inputs, so that the government will always feel that it is being monitored…Time after time, the system seems to spoil the government apparatus to grab public money…the program should be continuous and improve the people's knowledge and awareness of the ownership of public money."

Reporting back at Social Accountability Training, January 2012

national level, the project's activities in Jakarta were limited to a small group, and were not focused on social accountability, per se.

In summary, while the project was innovative in many ways and made a contribution to the results set out for all outcomes, it did not succeed in reaching the level of achievement claimed. In part, this was a consequence of the difficulty of taking on the complex issue of "weak governance" in Papua, and of the constraints facing any externally-based agency operating in Papua. In part, it resulted from limitations of the initial consultations and planning during the "commitment building" phase. Because of these limitations, project activities, particularly in relation to building capacity and establishing the CSO Forum, were not adequate in scope, depth or duration to achieve their objectives.

(iii) Efficiency

Given the model of programming delivery that was adopted, the project was relatively efficient in its management of resources for the purpose of working towards results. The project team worked extremely hard to make optimum use of its time on the ground in Jayapura. Staffing and travel costs were high: $103,650 (or 51 per cent) of a total project operating budget of $202,500 (the total grant minus the UNDEF monitoring and evaluation component). However, given that the project team was at the centre of everything and that program delivery only occurred when the team members travelled to Papua, this was not surprising.

There were a few activities which added little to the project and which were hard to justify as contributing to project effectiveness or impact. These included:

- The initial consultation with experts in Jakarta, which had no influence on project plans ;
- The National Seminar at the conclusion of the project, which focused on perspectives on developments in Papua, and not on the project and its focus on social accountability. This event may have helped to maintain interest in Papua among political and academic elites in Jakarta, but had little relevance to project objectives
- The study-tour to Australia for two senior members of the Project Team and one representative of ICS, Papua. While this was not a high-cost item ($19,500), and No doubt, was professionally worthwhile, it provided benefits mainly to CSIS in building its capacity and profile in social accountability and Papua research, and only indirectly assisted the project. It also distracted attention, and transferred resources, from work in Papua; and,
- The production of an academic paper on Social Accountability in Papua.

The Causes of Weak Governance in Papua: Extract from transcript of recorded Interview in Jayapura (April 29) with Father Neles Tebay (see photo below), noted as a determined advocate for Dialogue between Papuan Nationalists ("Separatists" in the Government's view) and the Government of Indonesia:

"Papua is governed on the basis of the Special Autonomy Law, first implemented in 2002. "From the Papuan people's perspective, the Special Autonomy Law has failed to apply…Local Government in Papua claims that there has been some progress since the implementation of Special Autonomy, but the people ask: what are the indicators of progress?" When criticism is directed at the provincial government, "they say that the national government gave us the law, and so they blame the national government. On the other hand, the national government says: we already gave the local government a lot of money, and 28 district or city government heads, who are Papuan natives, so it is because of them, who do not use the money effectively. Those parties blame each other.

So we asked the national government: did you provide any direction, guidance or kind of operational standard when you gave the local government money" – so that when money is provided it is allocated through specified channels and expenditure mechanisms. "This will allow us to measure how the money is used. In fact, they give the money and do not ask what it is for. There is no guidance. It means it will depend on the local leaders, who will receive the money.

There is no local government law and no basis for evaluation…As there is no operational standard, there is no check list - and everything is like flying in the sky. But again, the crucial problem is the absence of budget guidance….I know that, whether we give the local government a little or a lot of money, matters would not be much different. If you give them money, what do you want from them? There is no strategy; there are no targets .In the education sector: what do we want to have after 25 years of Special Autonomy implementation? There is no evaluation, and this is already more than a decade".

One further activity, a consultation with "gender and vulnerable groups" –which consisted of a meeting between the project team and a member of the City Council with a group of 18 women market traders- was isolated from other project activities, and, unfortunately, had no influence in broadening the base of beneficiaries supported. The failure to integrate this activity into the overall project strategy, or to devote more attention to ensuring involvement of women and marginalized groups in activities and projected results, represented a missed opportunity.

The project was well-managed by CSIS. However, the decision to minimize delegation of responsibility to a Papua-based partner led to inefficiencies resulting from decisions made at a distance from operations, and an inability to provide continuity in engagement with project participants in Papua between activities.

(iv) Impact
The project is given credit by participants and observers for having introduced ideas concerning social accountability to an audience of CSOs, local government officials, teachers and students, academics and journalists. It is also recognized for using its credibility as a mainstream Indonesian institution in pioneering cooperation and dialogue between local government and

CSOs, and for introducing an effective and practical methodology (the Citizens' Report Card or CRC) through which to assess the quality and reach of public services.

Even in a difficult environment, where there is little experience on the part of citizens or officials with democratic practice, and where political elites may have little incentive to introduce reform, all of these elements of the project could prove to be catalytic. For them to be so, would require CSIS to be committed to building on the project and to developing a more effective process to facilitate institutionalization of the innovations launched, while also building higher-level political support.

The beneficiaries interviewed all spoke positively of the ideas introduced by the project and indicated that they valued what they had learned. Comments on the CRC were especially enthusiastic. In particular, there was appreciation for the way the project team had brought together government officials, teachers and CSOs to work together in devising indicators for the CRC survey and, later, assessing results.

At the same time, there was universal disappointment at what was seen as the short-term approach adopted by the project, the limited investment in capacity development and the failure to build up the CSO Forum. There was little expectation that - by itself - the project would bring changes in furthering the cause of democratization in Papua. To balance this, many stakeholders expressed the hope that the investment made would not be wasted and that CSIS would continue its work in Papua, preferably with a stronger commitment to partnership.

(v)Sustainability

It is not easy to comment on the sustainability of the innovations introduced by the project. It is apparent that the ideas concerning social accountability and its place in facilitating good governance presented and disseminated through the project found an interested audience in Papua. What is less clear is the staying power of the processes pioneered in the project, particularly the application of the Citizen Report Card (CRC). While a number of government officials indicated their desire to do more in utilizing the CRC, beyond the project, there has been no follow up. Similarly, none of the members of the CSO Forum have taken the initiative to continue to meet or to establish the organization on a more formal basis. Without further external funding, and, at least initially, external facilitation, it is unlikely that the project will have succeeded in securing sustainable results.

For the future, more attention to building programming around a locally-based steering committee, and investing resources in nurturing ownership on the part of the group, might produce more promising long-term results. On the basis of the interviews conducted for the

evaluation, it would seem to be the case that there are several candidates among those who participated in the project who would be keen to play a role as a member of such a committee, giving the project the local leadership it lacked.

Given that other Jakarta-based organizations will have faced similar problems in maintaining a local presence or partnership in their programming and research in Papua, and if CSIS intends to maintain its involvement in the territory, it may be that a joint approach to addressing the problem will be worth considering. This might involve development of a modest affiliated centre in support of enhanced governance at a university or college in Papua, with a steering committee of both Papuans and representatives of Indonesian university research centres, think tanks and NGOs with a proven interest in the subject. Staff might be seconded to the centre, and an effort made to build up a small local staff complement. The centre would then be an implementing partner in ongoing research, policy development and social accountability work. Finance might well be available from both Indonesian government and international sources.

vi. UNDEF Added Value

UNDEF's support was highly valued by the grantee, and the UN affiliation seems to have been welcomed by Papuan participants.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

(i) The project built on the previous experience of CSIS in undertaking projects and research in Papua, including an earlier UNDEF project in 2007-8, which focused on similar topics.

(ii) Despite the grantee's apparent awareness of the complexity of local social, cultural and political dynamics, it made no provision in the project design for a partnership or partnerships with Papua-based organizations. All activities depended on the arrival of members of the CSIS team from Jakarta. This resulted in the absence of continuity across activities and a short-term approach to addressing major issues. It also reduced the prospects for troubleshooting, maintaining close contact with stakeholders, and for local ownership of the project and its intended results.

(iii) The focus of the project on accountability of local government to civil society was certainly relevant to the broader problem of weak governance in Papua, which the project sought to address. Yet, the grantee's investment in initial baseline analysis and mapping of stakeholders, as well as of previous experience which might inform the project, was insufficient. As a result, a number of key issues were not given the attention they deserved, while some prior initiatives, directly relevant to the project, were overlooked.

(iv) The decision to implement the project without a local partner also contributed to limitations of the grantee's assessment of the local context, as well as the needs and interests of beneficiaries and stakeholders. While a local NGO was engaged to provide logistical support, it played no part in substantive discussions.

(v) The project team was diligent, hard-working and effective in ensuring that all activities were completed as planned, and carried out its program in a highly professional manner.

(vi) A number of the project's outcomes focused on capacity development. However, there were weaknesses in the project's capacity development strategy. This was reflected in the lack of sufficient attention to what was required to establish the CSO Forum as an active, self-sustaining organization. There was a similar failure to address the practical and institutional requirements for putting in place a mechanism in local government to support social accountability on an ongoing basis. Further, the workshops and dialogue sessions, intended to build the capacity of Papuan stakeholders in social accountability were too brief and short-term in duration and inadequate as a basis for building sustainable knowledge and skills.

(vii) The introduction by the project of the Citizens' Report Card (CRC) or "score card" as a technique for assessing the quality and reach of public services, and, thus, to

operationalize social accountability, was very successful. The effort by CSIS to launch a pilot initiative in education in Jayapura was highly-regarded by participants. It also stood out as an effective "learning-by-doing" approach to building capacity. However, to qualify this success, no provision was made for follow-up, building on the experience of the pilot initiative.

(viii) There was a tendency by the project team to take an expression of interest on the part of stakeholders, particularly government officials, as a formal commitment to act. Consequently, CSIS greatly overestimated the project's achievements as assessed in relation to the five outcomes specified. While the project made useful contributions in each of the areas covered by the outcomes, no sustainable results were obtained. There has been no follow-up action by either government or civil society to continue the project's work, and CSIS has made no further contact with project stakeholders.

(ix) For the most part, the project was well-managed and resources were handled efficiently for the purposes of contributing to the achievement of results. At the same time, there were a number of activities – including a national seminar in Jakarta, production of an academic paper, and a study-tour to Australia – which contributed little to results.

(x) Project beneficiaries responded positively to the value of the ideas concerning social accountability introduced to them by the project. Yet, none of the elements of social accountability have been introduced into local government practice in Papua, and none of the members of the CSO Forum continue to pursue the accountability agenda. As it stands, without further investment and external organizational leadership and facilitation, there is little to suggest that the project will have a lasting impact.

(xi) CSIS is a highly competent policy research organization, but it seems to lack some of the core competencies required to enable it to translate ideas into changed governance practice. For the future, the Centre will benefit from adding to its team expertise in local government/public administration, the organization of civil society, and capacity development. If it is to continue to work in Papua, it also must find a way to build a partnership with local organizations. One interim approach would be to establish a Papua-based steering committee, to invest in building its capacity, and to share decision-making responsibilities with it.

(xii) A further option for consideration will be the development of a joint approach with other Indonesian institutions with a strong interest in the future of Papua and improved governance in the territory, whereby a small centre is established at a local university or college. The centre would then play the role of implementing partner in future projects and provide an ongoing local presence for its sponsors, while also strengthening local capacities.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

     (i) CSIS reconsider its approach to project design, with particular attention to including a comprehensive stakeholder mapping and project scoping exercise at the outset (based on Conclusion iii)

     (ii) CSIS ensures that it devotes attention to ensuring that senior decision-makers will provide the necessary level of support for proposed project results to provide a higher probability for their sustainability (based on Conclusions iii and viii).

     (iii) In future projects in Papua, CSIS recognizes the necessity to maintain continuity of engagement with stakeholders by building a partnership with local organizations, perhaps through a steering committee. *It is further recommended that* consideration be given to developing a joint approach with other like-minded Indonesia-based institutions with a view to building up a small centre at a university or college in Papua to perform a role as implementing partner in future projects and research initiatives (based on Conclusions ii and xii).

     (iv) CSIS takes the necessary steps to build up its professional competencies in capacity development to strengthen the prospects for the sustainability of the results of future projects in Papua and elsewhere. *It is further recommended that* care is taken in ensuring that future projects are informed by a capacity development strategy well-adapted to the local context (based on Conclusion vi).

     (v) CSIS considers broadening the professional base of its team for future work in Papua by adding expertise in: local government and public administration and civil society organizational development (based on Conclusion xi).

VI.   ANNEXES
ANNEX 1: EVALUATION QUESTIONS

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context? ▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why? ▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached? ▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not? ▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives? ▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs? ▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability? ▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address? ▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative? ▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization? ▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact? ▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?
UNDEF value-added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc.). ▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF‟s comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?

ANNEX 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Project documents:
Project Document, UDF-INS-09-323
Mid-term Progress Report
Final Financial Report 04 2014
Final Report
Memorandum of Understanding
Milestone Verification Mission Reports, 24/25 January, 2012 and 13 December, 2012

Other Documents and Reference Materials:

Asia's Palestine? West Papua's Independence Struggle. The Diplomat (US), 7 November, 2013;

Bobby Anderson, *""Living without a State",* Inside Indonesia, October-December, 2012;

Bobby Anderson, *"Platitudes of Papua"*, Inside Indonesia, January-April, 2014;

Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua. International Crisis Group, Asia Report 232, 9 August, 2012;

Charles Reading, *"Papua: the Elusive Dialogue,* Open Democracy, 23 April, 2010;

Securitization in Papua: the Implications of the Security Approach towards Human Rights Conditions in Papua. Jakarta: Imparsial, 2011.

Muridan S. Widjojo et al*, Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future* Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI), 2008.

ANNEX 3: SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS

A. JAKARTA

27 April 2014, Sunday
Introductory meeting and joint planning, International and National Consultant; National Consultant in Papua, Monday AM to Wednesday PM
28 April 2014, Monday
1. Meeting at Indonesian Parliamentary Research Office: Ms Riris Elizabeth, Mr. Poltat Potagi Naingola; 2. Pastor Romo Beny, 3. Mr. Yorrys Raweyai (from Papua), MP, House of Representatives, Parliament of Indonesia; Ms. Nancy Natalia (daughter of Mr. Raweyai), former Special Assistant to Minister of Trade.
29 April 2013, Tuesday
1. Ms. Poengky Indarti, Executive Director, *Imparsial* (the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor); 2. Dr. Adriani Elizabeth (Ms), Senoir Research Associate, Indonesia Research Institute (LIPI).
30 April 2014, Wednesday
1. At CSIS: Ms. Ica Wulansari, journalist and university lecturer, Documentation Specialist, CSIS Project team; 2. Mr. Pierre Marthinus, Program Director, Papua Centre, Faculty of Social and Political Studies, Universitas Indonesia; 3. At CSIS: Dr. Medelina Hendytio, Deputy Executive Director, and Head of Department of Politics and International Relations, CSIS; and, Dr. Vidhyandika Perkasa, Senior Researcher.
I May, Thursday, National Holiday
1. Debriefing and report planning meeting, International and National Consultants, on return of National Consultant from Jayapura, Papua.
2 May 2014, Friday
Departure of International Consultant for Taiwan and Canada, and of National Consultant to Yogyakarta.

B. JAYAPURA, PAPUA (National Consultant)

27 April 2014, Sunday
Following meeting with International Consultant, departure by air for Jayapura, Papua (arrives early AM Monday).
28 April 2014, Monday
1. At airport: Mr. Hans Z. Kawai, Lecture, Faculty of Economy, Cenderwasih University, Jayapura; 2. Mr. Sindung Rizkyanto, Journalist at JUBI (tabloid), formerly at TOP TV (both in Jayapura); 3. Ms. Maria Rumades, Staff Member at Local Development Board (BAPPENA), formerly Head of Division of Monitoring and Evaluation, both positions in Provincial Government; 4. Mr. Clifford Korwa, Head, Division of High & Vocational Schools, Education & Culture Department, Jayapura City.
29 April 2013, Tuesday
1. Ms. Herlina Manufandu, PW-GKI (women's organization), Christian Biblical Church of Papua; 2. Mr. Ottow Rumaropen, Head, YPK (Christian Education Foundation); 3. Father Neles Tabay, Office of Theological Higher Education, "Fajar Timur",Jayapura; 4. Mr. Josner Simanjunkak, Judge in Provincial Anti-Corruption Court; 5. Mr. Gustaf Griapon, Member of Sekolah Demokrasi (NGO), & Director of Radio Broadcasting for Jayapura District Government; 6. Ms. Yulinana Pigay, Traditional Market Trader and Leader of Papuan Traditional Market Traders' Union.

30 April 2014, Wednesday
1. (Ms) Dra Sipora Nelei Modouw, Retired Provincial Government Officer (former head of Office of gender Empowerment); 2. (Mr.) Muh Darwis Massi, Elected Member of City Legislature (City Council); 3. Ms Aria Yuvite Gobay, Lecturer, Port Numbay College of Economy, and Cenderawasih University, Jayapura; 4. Informal Conversations: Mr. Pernandes Silaen, Provincial Government Officer, Department of Marine Issues and Fisheries; Mr. Yason Apaserai, Sekolah Demokrasi, Papua.
I May, Thursday, National Holiday
Return by air to Jakarta Debriefing and report planning meeting, International and National Consultants, on return of National Consultant from Jayapura, Papua.

ANNEX 4: LIST OF ACRONYMS

ATAP   Papuan Transparency Alliance
AUSAID   Australian Agency for International Development
CRC   Citizens' Report Card
CSIS   Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CSO   Civil Society Organization
ICS   Institute for Civic Strengthening
NGO   Non-Government Organization
PATTIRO   Pusat Telaah dan Informasi Regional
SA   Social Accountability
UPIK   Unit Pelayanan Informasi dan Keluhan