PROVISION FOR POST PROJECT EVALUATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY FUND
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EVALUATION REPORT

TRANSTEC

UDF-RAS-11-433 – Engaging civil society and youth in public policy dialogue in North Africa

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Authors

This report was written by Pierre Robert and national experts Mostafa Kharbachi (Morocco) and Béchir Bouraoui (Tunisia). Aurélie Ferreira coordinated the evaluation. Landis MacKellar and Aurélie Ferreira provided editorial and methodological advice and quality assurance. Eric Tourrès was Project Director at Transtec.

Maps of Morocco and Tunisia (scales differ) ©nationsonline.org

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(i) Project data

This report is the evaluation of the project "Engaging civil society and youth in public policy dialogue in North Africa", implemented from October 2012 to September 2015 inclusive by the Moroccan Center for Civic Education (MCCE), a Moroccan non-governmental organization (NGO), in partnership with the Social Development and Empowerment Center (SDEC), a Tunisian NGO. The project's operational budget was US$250,000.

According to the project document, its objective was to support involvement by young people in civil society organizations' (CSOs) activities and debates about public policy, through training and organizational support for local civil society projects. The project's expected outcomes were:
- "Target CSOs and youth build policy analysis capacity within their organizations or associations to identify problems and propose workable solutions to decision-makers";
- "Target CSOs and youth develop effective leadership and advocacy skills, enabling them to articulate their positions and convince local authorities to adopt their proposed solutions"; and
- "Participants develop a sustainable regional network of policy advocates among themselves, using social media platforms to share information on their public policy activities, best practices and lessons learned, continuing to do so after the project."

(ii) Evaluation findings

The project was **relevant** in that it correctly identified the need to develop the capacities of young people to engage with political decision-making processes by honing their analysis and advocacy skills, and the need to help CSOs and youth leaders to better network among themselves at national and regional level. Nevertheless, the project's relevance was hampered by weaknesses in problem analysis and by a degree of over-reliance on pedagogical methods, to the detriment of hands-on support to CSOs. The project's relevance could have been enhanced through some design modifications. For example, it would have been appropriate to seek involvement – and ultimately support for the project's objective and outcomes – from political decision-makers. Similarly, there could have been scope to invite women who are in decision-making positions, such as parliamentarians and government officials, to also speak to the participants, particularly to the young women among them. Training on leadership and advocacy skills could have been delivered by experienced civil society members instead of professional educators.

The project was relatively **effective**, in that most of the planned activities were implemented. In terms of planned outcomes, two were achieved – at least to some degree – but the third (establishment of a regional advocacy network) was not, by MCCE's own admission. The project was generally effective in terms of building the capacities of young people to organize and to conduct development activities, understood in a broad sense. Some but not all of these activities had an advocacy or political participation component. There was no attempt by participants to campaign collectively on any specific issue, though some did share online posts on political issues, based for example on current news items, links to online petitions and Twitter posts, etc. Participants' energies were mostly devoted to designing and implementing specific projects at

local level. This left them with little time or resources to engage in broader advocacy. For a "network of policy advocacy" to be effective, it is necessary to devote time and resources to steer the network, feed it with new information on a frequent basis, and generally support strategy development and campaign plans.

The project was implemented **efficiently** in that the planned budget was followed, with minimal changes. However, the overall costs of the project were relatively high, making it debatable whether the project represented sufficient value for money. The Financial Utilization Report demonstrates that project funds were used broadly in line with the original budget, as summarized by the table below. The main exception was that the amount of US$20,000 originally planned for activities in Libya was redirected to activities in Morocco and Tunisia, including some activities involving Libyan participants. About three quarters of the US$250,000 budget were devoted to Morocco. It is questionable whether this very unequal distribution of costs among the countries was the most efficient. It is regrettable that MCCE and its Tunisian partner SDEC did not cooperate more closely in the management of the project. There was no joint management team, only informal contacts between the directors of the two organizations.

The project achieved **impact** in two areas: directly, as a result of training activities, and indirectly, as a result of projects initiated by young people who took part in those training activities. Although such elements of impact could be identified, the project's impact on policy debate was less clear. Training activities undertaken by the project helped motivate hundreds of young people to take action in the civil society sector, and has imparted skills enabling them to do so. The key impact of the training has been to contribute to changes in attitude among participants. Much of this attitude change can be ascribed to the Project Citizen methodology, as well as to the hands-on training approach, in which participants worked in small groups to develop change strategies addressing specific, real-life concerns. Shorter-term, the evaluators could identify elements of indirect impact, related to changes that participants sought to bring about through local development projects, awareness-raising activities and social research. For example, groups have engaged in activities including awareness-raising on drugs; campaigns to encourage girls to complete secondary education; vocational training for young unemployed people; research on the exploitation of underage domestic employees, etc.

The project had significant elements of **sustainability**, in that it helped the two implementing NGOs enhance their organizational capacity and expertise in training of young people and supporting nascent CSOs. The sustainability of the activities initiated by young people trained by MCCE and SDEC is less clear, as expected. The CSOs set up by participants are by definition very new, not all of them may survive long enough to complete the plans their founders developed during the project.

(iii) Conclusions

- **The project was appropriate and relevant.** It was based on a good understanding of the need to support young people's political participation, and its design relied on a solid training methodology and an experienced team of trainers. The two implementing partners were experienced and reliable.

- **The project over-emphasized a pedagogical approach, as opposed to addressing underlying factors that shut young people out of political participation.** While the

project's training methodology was excellent, the project design did not include a sufficiently detailed analysis of the political economy surrounding participation in policy debates. This resulted in a failure to build on-going contacts between young people and political leaders.

- ***The project's Libyan component, while well-meaning, was over-optimistic.*** It was clear by the time the project started that activities would not be able to be carried out as planned in Libya. Despite some efforts to involve Libyan participants in some meetings in Tunisia and Morocco, the Libyan component had to be cancelled. A more detailed analysis of the situation in Libya at the time the project was designed could probably have avoided unrealistic expectations.

- ***The project was effective in terms of capacity building and development of leadership skills among participating young people.*** The project relied on a solid, proven training methodology and an experienced team of trainers. This helped ensure participants' motivation, and led to genuine skills development. Nevertheless, some aspects of the training – notably on advocacy campaigning and on cross-border networking – were not addressed in sufficient detail.

- ***The project's key strength was in encouraging participants to take action on local development – instead of policy participation as such.*** In practice, the project's encouragement of leadership skills and civic engagement led participants to focus on community development activities and civic education, with few identifiable direct attempts at influencing policy.

- ***Project management was appropriate.*** The project management team was experienced and ensured that budgets were spent in accordance with plans.

- ***There was an imbalance in funding between Morocco and Tunisia, and project management was not sufficiently collegial.*** More than 75% of the project funding was devoted to activities in Morocco, leaving only about 25% for Tunisia. This imbalance was reinforced as most of the funds originally planned for activities in Libya were redirected to use in Morocco. While the use of funds was consistent with plans of which UNDEF was aware, a more balanced approach to funding between the two countries would have been desirable, particularly in view of the needs in Tunisia in the post "Arab Spring" context. Close cooperation between MCCE and SDEC in project management could have helped ensure a degree of rebalancing during project implementation.

- ***The project had a direct impact on attitudes among participants in training activities; impact resulting from development action is likely also.*** The quality of the training imparted to participants clearly contributed to their motivation for further social and civic engagement. A substantial number of local projects were initiated by participants, some of which are likely to achieve an identifiable impact over time.

- ***The project would have enhanced its impact and sustainability if more focus had been placed on developing links between political decision-makers at local and national level, and young participants.*** The project, though it did train hundreds of young people, did not sufficiently work to reduce the gap between them and policy-makers. This issue should be addressed in subsequent project phases.

(iv) Recommendations

- *MCCE should continue training young people, supporting its work with a more detailed political economy analysis of the underlying factors hampering participation by young people in policy debates in Morocco and any other target countries.*

- *MCCE should design additional activities to raise awareness of the situation of young people among policy-makers, with regards to their participation in policy debates.*

- *MCCE should ensure that future cross-border or regional programs are implemented with a more collegial management process, and that funds are allocated to each country with a degree of flexibility, and in consideration of local needs and capacities.*

- *MCCE should continue to support efforts in Libya, to the extent possible.*

A training participant talks to the media – Casablanca, September 2014. ©MCCE

II. INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

(i) The project and evaluation objectives

This report is the evaluation of the project "Engaging civil society and youth in public policy dialogue in North Africa", implemented from October 2012 to September 2015 inclusive by the Moroccan Center for Civic Education (MCCE), a Moroccan non-governmental organization (NGO), in partnership with the Social Development and Empowerment Center (SDEC), a Tunisian NGO.[1] The project budget was US$275,000, of which US$ 27,500 was retained by UNDEF for evaluation and monitoring purposes.

According to the project document, its objective was to support involvement by young people in civil society organizations' (CSOs) activities and debates about public policy, through training and organizational support for local civil society projects. The project's expected outcomes were:
- "Target CSOs and youth build policy analysis capacity within their organizations or associations to identify problems and propose workable solutions to decision-makers";
- "Target CSOs and youth develop effective leadership and advocacy skills, enabling them to articulate their positions and convince local authorities to adopt their proposed solutions"; and
- "Participants develop a sustainable regional network of policy advocates among themselves, using social media platforms to share information on their public policy activities, best practices and lessons learned, continuing to do so after the project."

The project was had a regional scope, originally intending to cover Morocco, Libya and Tunisia. The security situation forced the cancellation of the Libyan component, Project activities included training for trainers on youth engagement and civil society engagement, onward training for selected youth encouraged to established CSOs and develop projects in their local areas, as well as annual summer camps for young people to acquire leadership and community service skills, as well as English-language skills. The coordinating NGOs, MCCE and SDEC, created networks of policy advocates by linking project participants through social media.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger set of evaluations of UNDEF-funded projects. The purpose of these evaluations is to "contribute to a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project, which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved".[2]

(ii) Evaluation methodology

The evaluation started in December 2015 with an initial study of project documentation, followed by visits to Morocco and Tunisia from 1 to 5 February 2016 inclusive. An international expert and national experts from Morocco and Tunisia conducted the evaluation. UNDEF evaluations are more qualitative than quantitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluation questions that

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[1] A Libyan partner NGO was originally due to participate in the project and Libyan youth were also due to be involved in cross-regional activities. This proved impossible due to the high level of political violence in Libya. Some Libyans participated in activities outside their countries, but no project activities took place in Libya. See Chapter III.
[2] See: Operational Manual for UNDEF-Funded Project Evaluations, page 6.

focus on the project's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and any value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex 1). This is to allow meta-analysis in cluster evaluations at a later stage. This report follows that structure.

The evaluators reviewed the standard project documentation: initial project document, mid-term and final narrative reports, milestones reports, etc. They also reviewed reports and studies about youth engagement in politics and policy debates in North Africa, particularly since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011 (see list of documents annexed to this report). As a result of this review (Launch Note UDF-RAS-11-433, December 2015), the evaluators identified the following key issues requiring scrutiny during the field visit:

- **Relevance: project approach.** The focus of the project was to enhance participation by young people in policy debates, through local CSOs. It was important to assess the relevance of this approach to the different contexts of the countries covered.
- **Relevance: gender equality**. While project reports noted the involvement of women among the young people participating in activities, the leadership of the targeted CSOs appeared to be largely male. The evaluators assessed the extent to which gender equality issues have been taken into account in the strategy and in the advocacy undertaken during the project period. Similarly, it was important to assess the extent to which women (individually or as part of CSOs) were able to take part in advocacy activities within the selected "showcase" projects.
- **Effectiveness: training.** Much of the project was predicated on the delivery of effective training to targeted CSO leaders and members. The contents of the training was assessed by the evaluators, who paid particular attention to the way the training evolved from the original Project Citizen template, and to the extent it addressed the issue of advocacy.
- **Effectiveness: advocacy.** The evaluators considered the completeness of the training and mentoring given to participating CSOs in relation to advocacy. In particular, they assessed whether it reflected good practices in advocacy, including the clear definition of target groups and messages, the integration of a range of advocacy tools, etc. They also assessed the extent to which social media were used in this aspect of the project.
- **Effectiveness: capacity building and networking.** The project highlighted the need to strengthen targeted CSOs' capacity, and to encourage the development of regional networks. However, the final report recognized that the latter outcome had not been sufficiently addressed. The evaluators will consider the work done in these fields, including since the project ended in September 2015, and assessed whether more could have been done to achieve this outcome.
- **Efficiency/project management.** The project initially involved partners in three countries (in practice only two because no substantial action could be taken in Libya) but it was clearly designed and led by the Moroccan partner. The evaluators assessed the degree of involvement of the Tunisian partner in the design of the project. They also considered the extent to which project management and progress monitoring were undertaken in a collegial manner. The evaluation also assessed the nature and timeliness of the support given to CSOs at local level during project implementation.
- **Sustainability and impact.** The Final Narrative Report (FNR) outlined some project impacts and achievements. The evaluation sought to find out the current situation, and whether the successes described were sustained over time.

The evaluators met a range of stakeholders during their visit:
- In Morocco (Casablanca and Bouznika):
    - MCCE leadership and project team;
    - Trainers;
    - CSO members who participated in training sessions and received support;
    - Young people involved in debates and advocacy; and
    - Representatives of local authorities.

- In Tunisia (Hammamet):
    - SDEC leadership and staff;
    - Trainers;
    - CSO members who participated in training sessions and received support; and
    - Young people involved in debates and advocacy.

In addition, a phone interview was conducted with a US-based volunteer who conducted the annual summer camps on leadership and community service. A list of people interviewed is annexed to this report.

(iii) Development context

In **Morocco**, youth aged 15 to 24 form about 20% of the population. Morocco's Planning High Commission estimates that 18.4% of the urban population is in this age range (21.2% in rural areas). This constitutes an opportunity in economic and social terms, but also a challenge because many young people are unemployed, or only find precarious work in the informal sector. Youth engagement in civic life is weak. Although political parties all have youth wings, they do not attract young people and do little to familiarize them with participatory democracy. Political parties' failure to develop programs that promote the interests of young people has contributed to frustration and disinterest towards politics.

The Arab Spring was a clear sign of young people's deep feeling of exclusion from political decision-making processes. Beyond demands for more democracy, respect for human rights and improvements to governance and accountability, Morocco's youth expressed a wish to fulfill ambitions and to participate fully in economic, social and political life. In the face of slow-moving public policies that do not take fully their concerns to heart, young people look for alternatives.

Some changes have happened since 2011 in Morocco. A new Constitution was adopted in 2011, with new provisions on democratic principles, human rights and decentralization. The Constitution also reinforced safeguards for human rights, including gender equality, and contains specific provisions encouraging the participation of young people in social and political life, including through the establishment of the Consultative Council on Youth and Community Action. In 2014, the Government of Morocco adopted a national strategy on youth integration (2015-2030), with input from relevant ministries as well as from international organizations (UNICEF, UNFPA and World Bank in particular), seeking in particular to enhance economic opportunities for young people, and to improve their access to basic services and their participation in political decision-making processes.

In **Tunisia** too, young people represent a sizeable proportion of the population – 30% of Tunisia's 11m citizens are under 25. While young people played a major role in the January 2011 that toppled the former president, their expectations of positive change were largely unmet:

little progress has been made in terms of public policies in favor of youth. Meanwhile, unemployment among young people continued to hover around the 30% mark (against a nationwide average of 18% in 2015, according to official figures).

Despite the adoption of a progressive new Constitution in January 2014, administrative and institutional reforms that could benefit young people, including decentralization and local democracy, are progressing at a slow pace. Young people have difficulty being heard, as public policy discourse is largely monopolized by personalities from the old regime and by self-appointed "experts" with little knowledge of local reality. In this context, the emergence of civil society provides an opportunity for young people to channel their energy. According to an estimate by Centre IFEDA, over 18,000 CSOs have been established since 2011, many of which focusing youth: raising awareness about democratic processes and rights, dissemination of information on elections, etc. A number of bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as foundations from a range of countries, have developed programs in Tunisia in support of the emerging local civil society movement. This should contribute to the gradual emergence of a bottom-up, participatory approach to political decision-making, particularly at local level in a context of decentralization of power. However this process is only beginning, and much remains to be done to develop the capacities of civil society in Tunisia.

In both **Morocco** and **Tunisia**, education is a key policy concern. In early 2916, Morocco initiated reforms aimed at improving the quality of education, including by partially reversing a long-standing policy of "arabization" (use of Arab as the sole language of teaching in the public education system), now seen as partly responsible for a drop in education standards. In Tunisia too, access to education is far from universal – some children still live too far from primary school to be able to attend every day – and standards are also seen to be insufficient. In both countries, governments and the teaching profession therefore has a crucial role to play in enhancing education access and standards.

Meeting on young people's electoral participation, Morocco, October 2015. ©MCCE

MCCE and SDEC.

The MCCE was established in 2003 with support from Moroccan teachers and school inspectors, to develop democratic awareness and practice among young people, particularly through the education system. Since 2008, the MCCE has a formal partnership agreement with the Ministry of Education. The MCCE has developed partnerships on civic education with like-minded organizations in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as with the Council of Europe and US-based universities. The SDEC in Tunisia is one of the MCCE's long-standing partners. Former senior Ministry of Education officials co-founded the SDEC in 2008 (though it only gained official recognition in 2011), with the aim of enhancing civic education. After the fall of Tunisia's former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the SDEC was instrumental in identifying and building the capacity of young community leaders, helping them establish CSOs and design local development projects. The SDEC continues this work while also maintaining its participation in regional civil society networks focusing on civic education, gender equality and democratic accountability.

Group work, Casablanca, 2015. ©MCCE

III.   PROJECT STRATEGY

i.   Project strategy and approach

Strategy

The project is basically bringing together a civic education methodology – which the MCCE had used for several years before the project – and standard civil society capacity building techniques, specifically targeted at young adults. One premise underpinning this strategy is the experience of the Arab Spring of 2010-11, the project document noted, protests by young people had been instrumental in bringing about a wave of changes in the target countries. In addition to observing that young people had been at the forefront of the Arab Spring protests, the project document also noted that it was important to equip youth with "tools" to contribute to public policy debate and help build democratic institutions.

This analysis led to the project strategy, which can be summarized in the following three steps:

1. Civic education was to be improved for secondary school students in the target areas. This would be done through training trainers (mainly secondary school teachers) in the Project Citizen (PC) civic education methodology that MCCE knew well.
2. A small number of secondary school students – selected on the basis of their motivation and of their mastery of English – would participate in a week-long "summer camp" on leadership and community service, facilitated by volunteer US-based experts who had previously run similar sessions with MCCE.
3. Youth leaders were to be selected from among local activists in the target areas, and given additional training in civil society organizational development and project management, with a view to encouraging them to implement development projects in their local area, and to engage local authorities in a dialogue on local development needs.

An additional step consisted in networking among project stakeholders, essentially through Facebook and secondarily through websites and email lists. At the time the project was designed (2011), there were grounds to select the three project countries:

- In Morocco, the Arab Spring protests had led to demands for more freedom of expression and political pluralism. The Government of Morocco had responded by issuing constitutional amendments, which were debated in early 2011 and adopted by referendum. The amendments resulted in enhancing the powers of the Prime Minister. Further reforms, including in relation to the status of women, were also promised. The scope for civil society to contribute to public policy and to keep government accountable therefore appeared to be broadening somewhat.
- In Tunisia, the Arab Spring had led to the ouster of president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in January 2011. Previously illegal political parties were legalized, and political prisoners were freed. Subsequent months saw significant unrest and instability, and a Constituent Assembly was elected in October. A complex and sometimes fraught national debate ensued to draft a new Constitution. This was concluded in 2014, and the new Constitution was widely praised by the international community for its democratic provisions and its promotion of gender equality,
- In Libya, 2011 saw an anti-government uprising, which led to the ouster and subsequent murder of long-standing ruler Muammar Gaddafi, in October, after a military intervention

by Western and Arab states. The National Transitional Council (NTC) established at that point promised a democratic government – a promise that it could not keep as the country splintered into areas controlled by warring factions. However, in 2011, it was possible to under-estimate the extent of the civil war that would plague the country in subsequent years. An optimistic reading of the situation made it possible to imagine that a civil society movement could emerge in Libya as it had done in other Arab states with a weak central government – including Yemen for example. See box in chapter IV.

In the event, the Libyan component of the project could not be implemented due to the level of political violence that engulfed the country. The Tunisian component was implemented with some delays, and some cross-border activities planned in Tunisia were moved to Morocco. Overall, the region's instability led to the project being implemented over three years instead of the two-year duration planned originally.

Approach
The project approach was pedagogical: in essence, it was building on the MCCE's teaching expertise, combined with civil society capacity-building experience. SDEC, for its part, had less of a pedagogical background (although its founder was an education expert) but had more hands-on experience of civil society capacity building.

It is notable that both organizations implemented the project as part of a range of other projects and programs. For example MCCE has been hosting the "summer camps" on leadership and community service for several years prior to the project, and the Tunisian CSO leaders who participated in the project had been identified and trained by SDEC starting in 2011. As a result, some of the youth who benefited from training as part of the UNDEF-supported projects had difficulty distinguishing it from other projects running concurrently.

Training completed. Casablanca, October 2013. ©MCCE

ii.   Logical framework

The framework below aims to capture the project logic. In view of the focus placed by the project document on outcomes and indicators, these are set out in separate columns. There were different formulations of the long-term development objective in the project document: the text given in the right-hand column attempts to cover all aspects of the various formulations. The activities should not necessarily be seen as serving only one outcome each.

Project outputs	Output indicators	Project outcomes	Development Objectives
• 14 lead trainers on PC trained in regional training of trainers (ToT). • 120 CSO teams and 120 youth groups are trained and implement PC process. • 120 CSOs organize roundtable discussions with local decision-makers on policy proposals. • 120 youth leaders meet university or local officials on policy issues. • 24 youth leaders participate in Summer Camp on leadership and community service. • One local showcase organized in each of the 10 project localities. • One national showcase in each country. • Two social media platforms used to share information and advocacy among project leaders. • Regional network of at least 240 CSOs and youth groups.	• Number and % of lead trainers who demonstrate knowledge of PC process and ability to lead PC sessions. • Number and % of target CSOs and youth groups who involve at least 25 people in policy issues identification and solution development. • Number and % of CSO, youth group policy proposals that are presented to local decision makers during a PC roundtable. • Number and % of such policies that are approved at local level. • Number of success stories added to website each quarter. • Number and % of project participants who register on PC Facebook Group. • Number and % of active members in the regional network.	Target CSOs and youth build policy analysis capacity within their organizations or associations to identify problems and propose workable solutions to decision-makers. Target CSOs and youth develop effective leadership and advocacy skills, enabling them to articulate their positions and convince local authorities to adopt their proposed solutions. Participants develop a sustainable regional network of policy advocates among themselves, using social media platforms to share information on their public policy activities, best practices and lessons learned, continuing to do so after the project.	To contribute to increased dialogue on policy issues between CSOs and youth groups in North Africa, and local decision-makers and other stakeholders.

IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS

This evaluation is based on questions formulated to meet the criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The questions and sub-questions are found in Annex 1 of this document.

(i) Relevance

The project was relevant in that it correctly identified the need to develop the capacities of young people to engage with political decision-making processes by honing their analysis and advocacy skills, and the need to help CSOs and youth leaders to better network among themselves at national and regional level. The project's relevance was enhanced by appropriate design, using tried and tested methods for mobilizing and motivating young people, and underlining a gender equality approach.

Nevertheless, the project's relevance was hampered by weaknesses in problem analysis and by a degree of over-reliance on pedagogical methods, to the detriment of hands-on support to CSOs. In essence, the weaknesses that affected relevance were the following:

- The project – while it accurately identified the importance of youth participation in policy debates – did not fully analyze the political, economic and social challenges faced by young people who wish to participate in decision-making. These included, for example, a cultural emphasis on respect for old age as well as the economic disempowerment of young generations, who often experienced difficulties finding employment.
- The project also relied to a large extent on young people's own initiative to set up and develop CSOs, despite the clear challenges of lack of funds and credentials such CSOs faced.
- With regard to gender equality, the project document did emphasize the need to address young women as well as men, but did little to help women beneficiaries to address women's rights or other aspects of gender equality in their subsequent CSO activities.

Response to needs

The project design was based on an excellent understanding of the capacity building needs of young people. The grantee, MCCE, had ample experience of civic education in Morocco and the region, gained over almost a decade prior to the project, including through partnerships with other like-minded institutions in the region and in Western countries. In view of MCCE's past experience, the use of the Project Citizen (PC) methodology was logical, PC having been used by MCCE in the past and the MCCE trainers being well versed in this approach. MCCE had had ample time, in the years prior to the project, to adapt the originally US-developed methodology to the Moroccan and regional context. The PC methodology, aimed at secondary school students, helps participants understand the importance of public policies as key elements that frame every citizen's livelihood and exercise of rights, fosters debating skills and addresses notions of community service and project design. In addition to PC, MCCE also developed training modules on CSO organization, project design and implementation, as well as training of trainers courses in these fields. In addition to these, the project incorporated annual week-long "summer camps" for selected secondary-school students, developing their leadership skills and encouraging community service through hands-on experience, for example by bringing participants to interact with orphaned children. The summer camps, being conducted entirely in

English, were also an opportunity for participating students to improve their English-language skills.

This pedagogical approach was sound and clearly addressed the correctly identified need to develop skills among young people that enable them to participate meaningfully in policy debate, and in development action. Nevertheless, the project's analysis of the situation and the needs did not sufficiently consider *why*, beyond insufficient skills, young people have been largely excluded from participation in policy debates. Had such an analysis been conducted, it could have noted the following challenges facing participation by young people in policy debates in the target countries:

- Cultural traditions and political practices that emphasize respect for old age and tend to concentrate political decision-making powers in the hands of the older generation. In general terms, it can be said that political decision-making in the countries targeted by the project is often concentrated in the hands of men who are senior in age and in social prominence. For example, in 2011, the Prime Minister of Morocco, Abbas El Fassi, was 71, while that of Tunisia, Beji Caid Essebsi, was 85. This context may make it difficult for young people and youth groups to establish their legitimacy.
- The lack of gender balance among people in positions of political power. For example, of the 44 cabinet officials who served under Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi between 2007 and 2011, only 6 were women. Also in Morocco, 16.7% of parliamentarians elected in November 2011 were women, owing largely to a law mandating that a quota of seats be reserved for women. The picture is more balanced in Tunisia, where women were holding 27% of

The Libyan component

The project document signed in September 2012 had been developed in late 2011. In addition to Morocco and Tunisia, plans called for activities to be implemented in Libya's capital Tripoli and in Benghazi, a major economic hub and the epicenter of the 2011 revolt against the rule of Col. Muammar Gaddafi. After Gaddafi was killed (during or after his capture by rebels in October 2011), government authority was formally vested in the TNC, which ruled Libya until the elected General National Congress (GNC) took over in July 2012. The GNC's shaky rule ended with elections to the Council of Deputies in 2014; no government has ruled the country in a unified way since 2012.

Gaddafi's overthrow briefly appeared to offer an opportunity for Libya's democratization. But factors including tribalism, rivalry for the control of oil sales, and the dissolution of the armed forces into militias, made it unlikely that a new regime could be peacefully established and maintained.

In this context, it was already unlikely by mid-2012 that the project objectives could be achieved in Libya. Nevertheless, a small Libyan component remained in the project, justified by the presence in Benghazi of a highly motivated NGO, which had argued that activities could be circumscribed to that city and to the capital Tripoli. Unfortunately, security conditions worsened across Libya towards the end of 2012, making it impossible for activities to take place, even in Benghazi (although some Libyan participants did attend events in Tunisia in 2013). In the event, security threats caused the Libyan partner NGO to cease operations in 2013, as its leaders took refuge in Egypt.

parliamentary seats in 2011, a proportion that grew to 31% in 2014. Despite the increased number of women in politics, it remains difficult for women – particularly the

young, and those with less education – to participate and be heard in democratic processes.

- The historical weakness of the civil society movements in Morocco and Tunisia also means that authorities do not traditionally consult with CSOs. Though the 2011 constitutional amendments in Morocco opened the way to the establishment of youth consultative councils at local level across the country, this provision had yet to be implemented in practice when the project began in 2012. Similarly in Tunisia, legal provisions on CSOs' participation in policy debates only emerged when the new constitution was adopted, in 2014.

An analysis of these challenges in the project document could have helped the MCCE tailor the design of activities and outcomes to address the specific challenges faced by young people. For example, the project could have included the following elements:

- Inclusion in the PC training and in the related training of trainers (ToT) of sessions analyzing the above constraints on young people's participation in political debates;
- Development of specific strategies to address these constraints, for example by encouraging young people to seek support from community elders, and young women from the older generation of women political figures.

The MCCE could also have considered developing an explicit advocacy strategy, as an integral part of the project, to identify specific target groups – such as senior politicians and women in decision-making position – and address relevant advocacy messages to them on behalf of the young people concerned. Although the project did in fact carry out a significant amount of media work and achieved visibility on web-based social networks (as reviewed in the next section), it did not do so as part of an explicit advocacy strategy. Instead, youth groups themselves were expected to conduct advocacy, which they did to some extent, particularly at local level. But they were not in a position to advocate on behalf of youth participation in general.

Improving relevance through project design
Could the project have enhanced its relevance by implementing a different project design? Although this is of course a hypothetical question, the following elements point to slight modification which could have been taken into account – or could be, in future phases of the project, since MCCE intends to continue training activities:

- It would be appropriate to seek involvement – and ultimately support for the project's objective and outcomes – from political decision-makers such as elected politicians and government officials. MCCE could, for example, invite elected politicians to give speeches to the participating young people. The MCCE could further develop participants' advocacy and lobbying skills by inviting, for example, senior journalists to also speak to the young people. Such invitations may not result in the invited speakers providing direct support to the participants, but they may enhance the visibility of the project among such senior invitees.
- Similarly, there could be scope to invite women who are in decision-making positions, such as parliamentarians and government officials, to also speak to the participants, particularly to the young women among them. By sharing their experience of "making it" to a high-level position, such invited speakers could provide welcome examples that might inspire and possibly support young women's participation in political decision-making.
- Training on leadership and advocacy skills, currently delivered by trainers with an educational background, could be complemented with training sessions delivered by

experienced civil society members. Although the MCCE trainers are themselves also civil society activists – many have worked for MCCE for many years in a volunteer capacity – it would be relevant to broaden the range of civil society representatives whose expertise could be harnessed by the project.

The outcome regarding the development of a regional network of policy advocates, while relevant, was an area of some weakness in the project design, in the sense that it relied mostly on participants taking the initiative to network among each other. However, this was also an area in which training was needed, and should have been provided by people with experience of online policy advocacy. While the participants – young people with undoubted online skills – were clearly familiar with social networks, they were not necessarily familiar with the basic principles of advocacy, online or otherwise. To achieve the desired outcome, therefore, it would have been necessary to include in project design a substantial element of training on advocacy, and on its online components, including elements such as how to write petitions, how to seek crowd-funding and/or donor funding, etc.

Partnerships
The project was developed by MCCE, which had an on-going partnership with SDEC in Tunisia. Nevertheless, most of the design work was carried out by MCCE, with little substantial input by SDEC. While this is not an uncommon situation in joint applications, a degree of collegiality in project design is generally advisable. On this occasion, more joint design work between SDEC and MCCE might have enhanced the relevance of the project, by drawing on SDEC's experience of working with women's groups and influencing religious leaders. The latter experience in particular, focusing on encouraging a more gender-neutral approach to religion, could have benefited this project and helpfully complemented MCCE's experience.

(ii) Effectiveness
The project was relatively effective, in that most of the planned activities were implemented. In terms of planned outcomes, two were achieved – at least to some degree – but the third (establishment of a regional advocacy network) was not, by MCCE's own admission. In terms of degree of achievement, as measured by the quantitative indicators mentioned in the project document, effectiveness was generally weak, in that few of these quantitative indicators were demonstrably met. However this finding needs to be balanced against the fact that the indicators were over-ambitious. As a result, a number of activities were implemented to an adequate standard even though this wasn't reflected in the quantitative data.

The project was generally effective in terms of building the capacities of young people to organize and to conduct development activities, understood in a broad sense. Some but not all of these activities had an advocacy or political participation component. The number of indirect beneficiaries (people who would benefit from the projects implemented by participating youth) is certain to have been significantly lower than the total of 120,000 people mentioned in the project document. Based on the information obtained during the field visit, it was difficult to see how that figure could eventually exceed several thousand, when all projects designed by participating young people are complete. This point is reviewed below.

In addition, there were the following concerns related to effectiveness:
- **Reporting**. The mid-term and final narrative report templates require UNDEF grantees to report actual implementation at activity, output and outcome levels, against original

intentions or targets. The templates are to be used by the grantee to explain any discrepancy between original plans and eventual achievements. However, MCCE's reports were extremely spare in this respect, mostly stating that achievements at each level were the "same" as original plans. This curt reporting papered over quantitative aspects, which went entirely unreported. Discrepancies between original quantitative indicators and eventual results were therefore neither discussed nor explained. The extent of the under-reporting raises concerns as to the overall sincerity of the mid-term and final narrative reports.

The following example clarify this concern:
- o Under Output 2.1, 120 CSOs were to organize roundtable discussions with local decision-makers on policy proposals. Ninety such proposals were anticipated (30 in Year 1, 60 in Year 2).
    - The FNR restated the intended output, without reference to numbers, and stated that the actual output was the "same".
    - In fact, interviews demonstrated that, while roundtable discussions were indeed held, the number of such discussions and the number of policy proposals were not explicitly recorded.
    - Participants' accounts of the roundtables showed that these were mostly open debates that did not address specific policy points, and tended instead to focus on presentations of young people's future plans.

To some extent, the lack of detailed reporting may be ascribed to a certain lack of clarity in the original project document – which for example did not define what was meant by "policy proposals", thus making reporting difficult. It is also the case that some of the quantitative targets in the project document were unrealistic (see examples of indicators in the box below). Nevertheless, the lack of explicit reporting on achievements and shortcomings remained a concern.

- **Gender**. The project document committed the grantee to "encourage gender equity in all program activities so as to keep a balance between males and females". Women were explicitly listed as intended beneficiaries in the final report. However, none of the quantitative targets in the project document supported this specific intention. The mid-term and final reports also contained no general indication of the gender balance among participants and beneficiaries – though such details were given for specific activities, during interviews with the evaluators. Women represented about half of all participants in PC and summer camp activities. A lower

> **Some unclear indicators and targets**
>
> Indicator 1.2: 102 (85%) of 120 CSOs implement an initiative that involves at least 25 people in the process. It is unclear who these 25 people should be: other young people, local officials, or teachers?
>
> Indicator 2.1: 288 (80%) out of 360 CSO policy proposals are presented to local officials. As most meetings with officials were unofficial, there was no formal, systematic record of what CSOs presented.
>
> Indicator 3.1: 48 (6 per quarter) success stories posted on project website. Many such stories were posted on Facebook and on the grantee's website, but not all of these concerned the activities of participating young people. The project document did not define the nature of the stories that would be counted towards this indicator.

but still sizeable proportion of women was also found among NGO leaders who participated in training, and among trainers.

Nevertheless, there was no systematic gender balance tracking among all project participants and beneficiaries. This made it difficult to assess the extent to which "gender equity" was actually achieved by the project.

Effectiveness at outcome level

The degree of achievement of the anticipated outcomes can be summarized as follows:

- *Outcome 1: Target CSOs and youth build policy analysis capacity within their organizations or associations to identify problems and propose workable solutions.* This outcome was largely achieved, in that the training given to participants helped them define policy issues. It should be noted however that some of the young people whose policy skills were developed were not CSO leaders – they were merely encouraged to establish CSOs in the future, or to otherwise engage in civil society activities. It should also be noted that the CSOs that were led by some participating young people were very small – some with as little as two or three members – which raised doubts as to their ability to influence decision-makers. Despite these limitations, the factors that contributed to the achievement of the outcome included the following:
  - *PC training methodology.* The US-originated training methodology was appropriate to the needs of youth in the region. MCCE had used it effectively previously, its trainers were familiar with it.
  - *Trainers' expertise and experience.* MCCE and SDEC relied on a cadre of experienced trainers, many of whom had worked or volunteered for these organizations for several years prior to the project. The trainers were mostly former secondary school teachers (or Ministry of Education inspectors). Some had also previously volunteered for other NGOs. They had experience of interacting with government decision-makers as a result of previous engagements on behalf of MCCE and SDEC.
  - *Grantee's contacts and mobilization capacity*. MCCE and SDEC both enjoy long-standing contacts with authorities (including their countries' ministries of education) and with the media. They were able to leverage these contacts to encourage political decision-makers to meet and support young people in their project-related endeavors.

- *Outcome 2: Target CSOs and youth develop effective leadership and advocacy skills, enabling them to articulate their positions and convince local authorities to adopt their proposed solutions.* This outcome was met to some extent, in that some of the participants in training activities contributed to the design of community development projects discussed with local authorities. Other trainees involved in CSOs stated that the project helped develop the capacity of CSOs to engage with government authorities and design new projects. Nevertheless, as MCCE itself stated in the final narrative report, the outcome was not fully achieved: further training was necessary for participants to acquire leadership skills necessary to effectively lead CSOs. Advocacy skills imparted through the project were also limited to direct lobbying of decision-makers; they did not include training on advocacy strategy. As in the case of the above outcome, much of the effectiveness should be credited to the proven PC training methodology, whose focus on "leadership skills" includes elements of advocacy. It does not, however, include explicit training on the design and implementation of advocacy strategies, which would have been necessary to better achieve this outcome.

- *Outcome 3: Participants develop a sustainable regional network of policy advocates among themselves, using social media platforms to share information on their public policy activities, best practices and lessons learned, continuing to do so after the project.* This outcome was not met – a point acknowledged in the FNR. In practice, the only platform used by participants to share information was the project's Facebook page, where users essentially told each other about events they held, and encouraged each other. But the posts – a large sample of which were reviewed by the evaluators – essentially focused on activities, and rarely if ever involved strategic discussions. There was also no attempt by participants to campaign collectively on any specific issue, though some did share posts on political issues, based for example on current news items, links to online petitions and Twitter posts, etc.

  On reflection, the failure to achieve this outcome is not surprising. It can be explained in part by the widespread use of Facebook by participants. Each Facebook page is in itself a platform for publicizing activities among other participants (as long as they are Facebook "friends"), participants therefore do not particularly need to use the MCCE Facebook page, which in itself doesn't bring much added value.

  Another reason for the outcome's failure is that participants' energies were mostly devoted to designing and implementing specific projects at local level. This left them with little time or resources to engage in broader advocacy, assuming they would have wanted to. It is also important to note that policy advocacy is a relatively risky undertaking in the political climate of the two countries, which has the potential of destabilizing participants' main aim, of undertaking development activities.

  This points to another element: for a "network of policy advocacy" to be effective, it is necessary to devote time and resources to steer the network, feed it with new information on a frequent basis, and generally support strategy development and campaign plans. Merely making an online "platform" available presents little added value, even if a moderator is involved. This lesson should be brought to the attention of future UNDEF grantees.

Effectiveness at activity level
The project activities were implemented, to a large extent, as planned. The breakdown of effectiveness at project activity level is as follows:
- *Training of trainers.* The ToT was held successfully, the selected trainers were highly experienced – many had worked previously for MCCE and those trainers whom the evaluators interviewed were appreciative of the PC methodology.
- *CSO teams and youth groups given PC training.* This activity was also implemented as planned. Participating youths were enthusiastic about the training, though MCCE noted that some follow-up training, to reinforce the acquisition of leadership and organizational skills, would have been useful.
- *Roundtable discussions with local decision-makers on policy proposals.* The roundtable discussions were held, but it is debatable whether many of them actually covered "policy" issues. Interviews with participating youth suggest that the discussions covered a mix of general issues (which can be considered policy) such as access to primary education, and debates about specific plans developed by CSOs. The latter type of discussions, about CSO plans, appear to have been the most frequent, while "policies", according to

participants, were only discussed in general terms that did not amount to "proposals", let alone proposals by CSOs.

- *Youth leaders discuss with university or local officials on policy.* The above comment largely applies to this activity, which in fact overlaps with the previous one.
- *Youth leaders summer camp.* This was doubtless an effective activity, and participants interviewed by the evaluators were full of praise for the process and appreciative of the skills acquired. It is to be noted, however, that such summer camps had been held on a more or less annual basis (depending on the availability of the US-based facilitator) for several years prior to this project. The inclusion of this activity in the project document is therefore somewhat redundant; since it is likely it would have taken place even if the other activities had not.
- *Showcases in project areas.* These were held, and formed opportunities for media work by MCCE and SDEC. There is ample evidence of media coverage of these events, some of which included the presence of senior national or local officials. The opportunity given to young people to showcase their project was doubtless encouraging, though it is not clear that showcased projects received additional support from local authorities.
- *Social media platform used.* As noted above, this activity was only implemented to a limited extent, in the sense that participants posted information about their activities, but conducted limited interactions with others.
- *Regional network of CSOs.* This activity was not really implemented, beyond the information-sharing element mentioned above. Though participants shared information about their respective activities, it cannot be said that this amounted to "networking', because the information-sharing did not lead to joint or coordinated action.

Overview of outcome indicators

The project document provided 10 outcome indicators, combining an absolute figure (for example, number of policy proposals put forward by youth groups) and a percentage (for example, percentage of CSOs that develop a policy proposal). The baseline figure was always zero, since the project document assumed that all CSOs would be first established during the project period.

As mentioned above (under "reporting") the outcome indicators raised some concerns. It was often unclear what precisely would be counted. In many cases, the indicators were based on pure assumptions: for example, that 85% of 120 youth groups would complete a PC initiative. Finally, MCCE's reports did not discuss the level of achievement of these indicators. The evaluators noted that, due to their imprecise nature and the absence of formal minutes of roundtable discussions with authorities, it was often impossible to know whether the indicators were achieved. The evaluators take the view that the grantee failed to give sufficient thought to the formulation of "SMART"[3] indicators, and to the monitoring of their achievement.

(iii)　　Efficiency

The project was implemented efficiently in that the planned budget was followed, with minimal changes. However, the overall costs of the project were relatively high, making it debatable whether the project represented sufficient value for money. On the other hand, project

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[3] That is: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound (these words are the most commonly used in the development assistance sector; other sectors use somewhat different terms).

management in Morocco and Tunisia was appropriate, though one could have expected more coordination between the NGOs in the two countries.

Use of funds

The Financial Utilization Report demonstrates that project funds were used broadly in line with the original budget, as summarized by the table below. The main exception was that the amount of US$20,000 originally planned for activities in Libya was redirected to activities in Morocco and Tunisia, including some activities involving Libyan participants.

Item	Amount (US$)*	% of budget**	Remarks
Salaries	54,890	21.9	Slight overspend. Contractual services line also includes salaries for trainers, etc.
Travel	8,700	3.5	Slight overspend. Some travel costs included in meetings/training budget.
Contractual services	66,200	26.5	Slight underspend. Includes all costs incurred outside Morocco, of which $20,000 were originally planned for activities in Libya.
Meetings, conferences, workshops, training	91,750	36.7	Slight underspend. All costs incurred within Morocco.
Advocacy/outreach	11,300	4.5	Slight underspend. Mostly spent on banners, website management, online presence, etc.
Miscellaneous	13,600	5.4	Slight underspend (audit, office rental, etc.)

*: Rounded figures – source: Financial utilization report
**: The operating budget was US$250,000

The examination of the budget and utilization report raises the following remarks:
- Excluding the Contractual Services line, virtually all costs were spent within Morocco – the only exception to this being the cost of flying some participants from Libya and Tunisia to meetings in Morocco. This means that about three quarters of the US$250,000 budget were devoted to Morocco – even before the cost of activities in Libya led to a further redirection of funds towards activities in Morocco and Tunisia. It is questionable whether this very unequal distribution of costs among the three (or two) countries was the most efficient. In hindsight, it appears that Tunisia's SDEC, which managed only US$40,000, made better use of its money than MCCE, which had over US$200,000 at its disposal.
- Similarly, the redirection of the funds originally devoted to Libya benefited primarily project activities in Morocco – though activities in Tunisia were also supported.
- Whereas the project objective included support to young people's participation in policy debates, the budget did not include spending on policy research, which could have supported such policy debates.

Project management

Project management was appropriate, in the sense that the planned activities were carried out (except of course in Libya), and that the standard of training was good. This owed much to the fact that trainers were highly experienced individuals, and that both MCCE and SDEC had long-term relationships with the trainers used for this project, and with other external facilitators, such as those involved in the summer course.

Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the two organizations did not cooperate more closely in the management of the project. There was no joint management team, only informal contacts between the directors of the two organizations, who know each other well.

(iv)   Impact

The project achieved impact in two areas: directly, as a result of training activities, and indirectly, as a result of projects initiated by young people who took part in those training activities. Although such elements of impact could be identified, the project's impact on policy debate was less clear. This is largely because the project design emphasized training and encouraged projects among young people, but could do little to change attitudes among society at large, particularly among local officials.

It is clear that the training activities undertaken by the project helped motivate hundreds of young people to take action in the civil society sector, and has imparted skills enabling them to do so. The key impact of the training has been to contribute to changes in attitude among participants: interviews showed that many participants who had previously felt unable to contribute to social change were persuaded to take action, while those who had wanted to act were better informed about ways in which they could influence governance. The training also helped impact organizing skills, and contributed to participants' understanding of the value of cooperation and coordination among civil society actors. Much of this attitude change can be ascribed to the Project Citizen methodology, as well as to the hands-on training approach, in which participants worked in small groups to develop change strategies addressing specific, real-life concerns.

The direct impact of the training, being largely related to attitude change, may become clearer in the long term. Shorter-term, the evaluators could identify elements of indirect impact, related to changes that participants sought to bring about through local development projects, awareness-raising activities and social research. Examples of activities undertaken by participating youths included:
- A journalist group whose members were initially trained by the project in Morocco, and who subsequently continued to raise civic awareness among young people in the Casablanca region;
- A network of activists, supported by SDEC in Tunisia as part of the project, has worked to persuade young people to vote at national and local elections;
- Other groups have engaged in activities including awareness-raising on drugs; campaigns to encourage girls to complete secondary education; vocational training for young unemployed people; research on the exploitation of underage domestic employees, etc.

Many of the CSO projects, initiated by young people who benefited from training by MCCE or SDEC, were still at an early stage at the time the evaluation took place. It was therefore too early to assess their performance. However, the very fact that dozens of projects had been initiated, in a wide range of locations and in many different sectors, was a sign that the project was on course to achieve impact at that level.

Nevertheless, it was difficult to identify elements of impact related to policy changes. Some project activities clearly led the groundwork for future impact – for example by bringing local elected officials together with young civil society members, as was done in each project location (in some cases those meetings persuaded participating young people to run as local election

candidates). The establishment by MCCE of a youth council network, bringing together members of these consultative councils, may also be seen as a milestone towards achieving impact in policy debates. One reason impact was difficult to achieve in terms of policy change was that governance structures in Morocco and Tunisia remain relatively unaware of the role civil society can play in policy debates.

This is changing to some extent, as demonstrated by interviews with commune-level officials, some of whom were aware of the potential role of the civil society sector in contributing to policy formulation at local level (in one Casablanca commune, 70,000 people were reported by the local authorities to be working in the civil society sector in 2015, twice the 2009 number).

Could the project have achieved a greater impact? In terms of policy debates, the project could have been more impactful if it had more systematically targeted local officials for awareness-raising sessions about the role of civil society. This could have helped youth groups to open local government doors. As mentioned in the relevance section, the project could have been more deliberate in addressing the underlying factors that hamper young people's participation in policy debates. Raising awareness among local officials could have helped change attitudes in this respect.

(v) Sustainability

The project had significant elements of sustainability, in that it helped the two implementing NGOs enhance their organizational capacity and expertise in training of young people and supporting nascent CSOs. MCCE and SDEC are solid organizations in their own right; the project helped them develop new areas of work and improve their training techniques. This should contribute to the further development of the two organizations, and encourage them to implement further joint projects.

The sustainability of the activities initiated by young people trained by MCCE and SDEC is less clear, as expected. The CSOs set up by participants are by definition very new, not all of them may survive long enough to complete the plans their founders developed during the project. Indeed, the evaluators were able to establish that most CSOs established by young people they interviewed were extremely small operations, sometimes bringing together as few as two or three people and rarely more than a dozen. These CSOs did not always have formal registration and mostly lacked elements such as an official board or defined roles for members of their leadership (treasurer, director, etc.). In some cases, SDEC and MCCE were able to provide some seed funding (SDEC) or to introduce CSOs to potential donors such as municipal authorities. In a limited number of cases, CSOs successfully applied for initial funding from foundations. However, in the main, the CSOs encountered during the evaluation were still at a stage where they needed to rely on their own resources.

V. CONCLUSIONS

(i)   The project was appropriate and relevant. It was based on a good understanding of the need to support young people's political participation, and its design relied on a solid training methodology and an experienced team of trainers. The two implementing partners were experienced and reliable.

(ii)   The project over-emphasized a pedagogical approach, as opposed to addressing underlying factors that shut young people out of political participation. While the project's training methodology was excellent, the project design did not include a sufficiently detailed analysis of the political economy surrounding participation in policy debates. This resulted in a failure to build on-going contacts between young people and political leaders.

(iii) The project's Libyan component, while well-meaning, was over-optimistic. It was clear by the time the project started that activities would not be able to be carried out as planned in Libya. Despite some efforts to involve Libyan participants in some meetings in Tunisia and Morocco, the Libyan component had to be cancelled. A more detailed analysis of the situation in Libya at the time the project was designed could probably have avoided unrealistic expectations.

(iv) The project was effective in terms of capacity building and development of leadership skills among participating young people. The project relied on a solid, proven training methodology and an experienced team of trainers. This helped ensure participants' motivation, and led to genuine skills development. Nevertheless, some aspects of the training – notably on advocacy campaigning and on cross-border networking – were not addressed in sufficient detail.

(v)   The project's key strength was in encouraging participants to take action on local development – instead of policy participation as such. In practice, the project's encouragement of leadership skills and civic engagement led participants to focus on community development activities and civic education, with few identifiable direct attempt at influencing policy.

(vi) Project management was appropriate. The project management team was experienced and ensured that budgets were spent in accordance with plans.

(vii) There was an imbalance in funding between Morocco and Tunisia, and project management was not sufficiently collegial. More than 75% of the project funding was devoted to activities in Morocco, leaving only about 25% for Tunisia. This imbalance was reinforced as most of the funds originally planned for activities in Libya were redirected to use in

Morocco. While the use of funds was consistent with plans of which UNDEF was aware, a more balanced approach to funding between the two countries would have been desirable, particularly in view of the needs in Tunisia in the post "Arab Spring" context. Close cooperation between MCCE and SDEC in project management could have helped ensure a degree of rebalancing during project implementation.

(viii)   The project had a direct impact on attitudes among participants in training activities; impact resulting from development action is likely also. The quality of the training imparted to participants clearly contributed to their motivation for further social and civic engagement. A substantial number of local projects were initiated by participants, some of which are likely to achieve an identifiable impact over time.

(ix) The project would have enhanced its impact and sustainability if more focus had been placed on developing links between political decision-makers at local and national level, and young participants. The project, though it did train hundreds of young people, did not sufficiently work to reduce the gap between them and policy-makers. This issue should be addressed in subsequent project phases.

Casablanca, 2013. ©MCCE

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

(i) MCCE should continue training young people, supporting its work with a more detailed political economy analysis of the underlying factors hampering participation by young people in policy debates in Morocco and any other target countries. MCCE should in particular seek to enhance links between trained youth and other CSO leaders, and relevant political decision-makers at various levels.

(ii) MCCE should design additional activities to raise awareness of the situation of young people among policy-makers, with regards to their participation in policy debates. MCCE's track record on civil education gives it the required credibility to address policy-makers at various levels and highlight the need for policy-makers to listen more closely to young people. It is also well placed to manage such discussion fora.

(iii) MCCE should ensure that future cross-border or regional programs are implemented with a more collegial management process, and that funds are allocated to each country with a degree of flexibility, and in consideration of local needs and capacities. One way to approach this would be for MCCE to develop partnership agreements that specifically establish a joint management team for such projects, and that include provisions encouraging all partners to exercise transparency in their need and use of funds.

(iv) MCCE should continue to support efforts in Libya, to the extent possible. This could be done, for example, by including in future project budgets some provisions for Libyan participation. Over the medium term, such efforts may lead to more substantial collaboration between MCCE (and its partners in other countries) and its Libyan counterparts.

VII. ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: EVALUATION QUESTIONS

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context? ▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached? ▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not? ▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives? ▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs? ▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability? ▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address? ▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative? ▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization? ▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact? ▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?
UNDEF value-added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc.). ▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF"s comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?

ANNEX 2: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Project documents UDF-RAS-11-433:</u>

- Project Document
- Narrative Final Report
- Financial Utilization Report
- Milestone Verification Reports

<u>External sources:</u>

- *Le défi de l'insertion des jeunes au Maroc*, by Arne Hoel, World Bank Report, July 2012
- *Tunisie: Surmonter les obstacles à l'intégration des jeunes,* by Mailka Drissi, World Bank Report, October 2014
- *Rapports finaux, Forums Jeunesse, Editions 2015, 2014, 2013. Institut Français, Tunis.*
- *Etudes sur les politiques jeunesse des pays partenaires méditerranéens : Maroc*, by Sylvie Floris, Euromed Youth, 2011

ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Name	Title
01/02/2016 Casablanca	
Elarbi Imad	Director, MCCE
Driss El Hajji	Trainer
El Habchi El Asri	Trainer
Mohamed Chakir	Trainer
Zineb Moussafir	Organizer
Abderrazak Morjani	Administrative assistant
Rouija Hamza	President, Local Youth Council, El-Jadida
Rahma Rougui	Member of the Moroccan Center of Youth and Democratic Transitions
Nabil Lmnouar	Philosophy Teacher
Abdelilah Abdellaoui	Local Youth Council, Salé
El Kalakhi Youssef	President, Moroccan Center of Youth and Democratic Transitions
Ms. Deborah Orsini,	Residential Summer Institute Trainer (interviewed from USA by phone)
02/02/2016 Casablanca	
Mr. Lkhili Abdelmalik	Greater Casablanca Vice-Mayor, President of Ain Chok Commune, Casablanca
Mr. Mohamed Ghannami	President of Al Fida Commune, Casablanca
Ms. Najwa Ennaciri	National Coordinator, Ministry of Education
Mr. Talbi Abdelkader	Ministry of Education, Settat
Ayoub Tazi	School Youth Association
Hamza Loulidi	Journalist, www.karama.ma
Ait Mounatter Mohammed	Journalist, Amazigh Press
Yassine El Chehof	Artist
Mohamed Amine Abkari	Elected Council Member and Al Alam Newspaper reporter, Bouznika
Oussama Elchhab	University Student
Ayoub Elharfaoui	Journalist, Ouardigha news
Abdelilah Naciri	President, Forum of Tomorrow
Bouchaib Hamraouy	Teacher and Journalist, Al-badil Press
Kamal Echchamsy	Journalist, Essabah Press
Chanaa Mohammed	Journalist, Madina News
Rachid Qablani	Journalist, Zenata News
03/02/2016 Casablanca/Travel to Tunis	
Soufiane Amntag	Trainee teacher
Ismail Attache	High School student
Kawtar Chamama	MA student
Widad Morchid	MA student
Amine El Kalakhi	High School student
Yahya Echatoui	Trainee teacher
04/02/2016 Hammamet	
Amara Benromdhane	SDEC Director
Mohammed Sabek Aouini	Civic education teacher, Nabeul
Farhat Khémissi	President, *Notre pays à tous* NGO, Le KEf
Dina Chafi	President, *Association pour le progrès familial*, Le Kef
Salah Séghayri	President, *Association Phénix*, Siliana
Ilhem Mansour	SDEC trainer, Ministry of Education Inspector-General for English
05/02/2016 Hammamet	
Khaled Mansouri	President, *Association Touiza*, Le Kef
Najia Salah	Civic education teacher, Nabeul

Ahlem Séghayar	President, *Association des femmes de Tunisie*, Siliana
Mohamed Berrached	Sociologist, SDEC trainer
Amara Benromdhane	Director, SDEC

ANNEX 4: LIST OF ACRONYMS

CSO	Civil society organization
FNR	Financial Utilization Report
GNC	General National Council
MCCE	Moroccan Center for Civic Education
NGO	Non-government organization
NTC	National Transition Council
PC	Project Citizen
SDEC	Social Development and Empowerment Center
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound
TNC	Transition National Council
ToT	Training of Trainers
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund