The grantee faced some challenges during project implementation in Iraq, but due to a well-developed risk mitigation plan, the grantee was able to manage. For instance, the grantee had anticipated the risk of the non-cooperation of some Governorate Councils, so when two of six identified Councils withdrew from the initiative, the grantee took rapid action to replace them. The Councils were absorbed into project activities without much loss of time, and the grantee and its partner organizations managed to build trust and understanding with the two added Councils rather quickly.

Although factors like the security situation in Iraq made it difficult to probe the impact of the intervention, significant advances were made in short-term government responsiveness and transparency to the public. The grantee published Annual Monitoring Reports to highlight the gap between public expectations and the actual performance of the Governorate Councils. These were circulated widely and managed to attract considerable interest from the mass media and senior government officials. In response, several of the participating Governorates Councils devoted greater efforts to transparency and providing information to the public. Further, the central government expressed their interest in expanding civil society monitoring to all provinces in the country.

As civilian oversight was a politically sensitive issue in Iraq, the support from an international third party like UNDEF added explicit value to the project. The legitimacy provided by the UN label alongside the grantee’s credibility and networking skills gave reassurance to both government and civil society partners in undertaking or supporting the initiative.

The monitoring training had some weaknesses. The training attempted to cover a great deal of detail, much of it technical, in two, short intensive workshops. More time should have been given to allow the trainees to fully absorb new knowledge. Another weakness was the decision to provide monitoring training to only one individual per partner organization. Such an approach limited the opportunity to build CSO institutional capacity, and is likely to limit the depth of commitment of the participating organizations to the monitoring process in Iraq.

The monitoring training had some weaknesses. The training attempted to cover a great deal of detail, much of it technical, in two, short intensive workshops. More time should have been given to allow the trainees to fully absorb new knowledge. Another weakness was the decision to provide monitoring training to only one individual per partner organization. Such an approach limited the opportunity to build CSO institutional capacity, and is likely to limit the depth of commitment of the participating organizations to the monitoring process in Iraq.