Burundi

The project would have benefitted from making use of knowledge gained during the training and research activities. This could have encouraged all actors to use the research and knowledge acquired as reference material in order to develop party practices at the Burundian national level. This could have reinforced declarations made by political party leaders before and after elections, and to give a sense of responsibility to grassroots communities with regard to the importance of their role when it comes to applying the acquired knowledge.

The logic of intervention of this project did not fully take into account the rift that exists between the centre and the periphery in Burundi: between the governing and the elected community and collines representatives, who for the main part merely execute power. The project intervention logic overestimated the level of impetus that could come from community leaders. The theory according to which the grassroots population would become more dynamic if only they knew their leaders better was overly optimistic, especially when considering the level of education that these populations have and the traumatic war experiences that are still very present within these communities.

The grantee’s political neutrality created an image favourable towards sustainable peace in Burundi and has allowed the organization to position itself as a known and respected mediator in potential conflicts.

The media coverage of the project helped remind stakeholders of the importance of maintaining peace in order to hold free, peaceful and reassuring elections. Media coverage on the concerns of citizens regarding security issues and on whether or not their aspirations and hopes regarding the electoral programmes would be taken into account, allowed the grantee to bring grassroots populations closer to political decision makers in Burundi and reinforce its strategy for advocacy.

Many of the professionals trained by the grantee before and during the project period have subsequently taken an active part in transitional justice related work in civil society, international organizations, the media and sometimes in state institutions in Burundi. Many representatives working on transitional justice and met by the evaluators had been trained by the grantee, and had used the skills they acquired to develop projects on behalf of their respective NGOs.

There was no explicit commitment on the part of the partners to achieving the project’s objective and results - as opposed to implementing the activities - and no formal agreement on operational standards. A formal Memorandum of Understanding between the three partners would have helped ensure more consistent implementation and follow-up of the activities regarding transitional justice in Burundi.

Although it foresaw the possibility of politically motivated delays, the project had little in place in the way of mitigation. The strategy in relation to institutional stakeholders in Burundi was not fully developed – for example there was no attempt to formalize and set an agreed framework for the project’s support and technical advice to the National Consultation Steering Committee.

The project could most probably have been more efficient if it had been more closely managed by the grantee’s office in South Africa. Its greater involvement would have enhanced the value of the project in the eyes of implementing partners and provided valuable assistance to the staff working on Burundi.

The project strategy did not fully consider how the grantee’s intervention would be received by government stakeholders. The grantee had built a positive record with civil society and the UN mission based on earlier training and technical advice and on the grantee’s international credibility. However they did not have a similar record with the government officials that were to lead the National Consultation Steering Committee and its technical advisory team. The credibility that the grantee built with the police through the implementation of the census project did not translate into an open door at the National Consultation Steering Committee.

Victims’ groups were established as a direct result of the project – for example groups of women who suffered from politically motivated sexual violence and survivors of the 1972 killings in Burundi.