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The objective of the project was to promote social change and empower women in the West Bank to increase their participation within local governance, specifically in urban and environmental planning at the level of local councils. The project also aimed to increase public awareness and support for women’s participation in local governance and urban and environmental planning. The project was implemented in the north, middle and south of the West Bank, focusing on zones where the Israeli authorities have control of land use. Upskilling local councils through the training of women - both elected and aspiring to election - was particularly relevant as it filled a specific and significant need to developing community governance in the most challenging areas of the West Bank.

The objective of the project was to promote social change and empower women in the West Bank to increase their participation within local governance, specifically in urban and environmental planning at the level of local councils. The project also aimed to increase public awareness and support for women’s participation in local governance and urban and environmental planning. The project was implemented in the north, middle and south of the West Bank, focusing on zones where the Israeli authorities have control of land use. Upskilling local councils through the training of women - both elected and aspiring to election - was particularly relevant as it filled a specific and significant need to developing community governance in the most challenging areas of the West Bank.

The overall goal of the project was to improve governance in Papua, Indonesia. Specifically, it focused on developing and implementing a practical strategy to build a forum for civil society organizations where civil society could develop skills in social accountability and promote accountability and transparency of the provincial and city governments. Given the deep suspicion of civil society on the part of government in Papua, the intention of the project was to establish the CSO Forum as a legitimate body in the eyes of both decision-makers and the public. Training was provided to all stakeholders – including government officials and a series of dialogue sessions was also organized. However, gaps in the initial baseline analysis and stakeholder consultations, along with a decision to implement the project without a local partner, reduced the project’s relevance to the Papuan context and the needs of beneficiaries. Eight visits to Papua over a two-year period by members of the Jakarta-based project team limited opportunities for contact between the visiting team and beneficiaries, and a lack of continuity across activities restricted what the project was able to accomplish.

The objective of the project was to enhance trust-building and cooperation among local government, nongovernmental organizations and extractive industries in Indonesia, by strengthening the capacity and credibility of NGOs as partners in corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. The focus was on improving the ability of local NGOs to forge permanent partnerships with companies and local governments in CSR policy design and implementation. The project was relevant, given the legal and fiscal requirements governing CSR, the degree of poverty in extractive areas, the lack of enforcement of CSR policies, and the lack of attention paid to civil society engagement and NGO involvement as direct benefits of CSR policies. However, the project risks and problems in terms of corporate and local government commitment were neither adequately identified nor addressed during the design and implementation phase.

The project aimed to build the capacity of young people in Palestine – primarily students at university in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – to contribute to understanding of tolerance and difference, with a view to bridging socio-political gaps within Palestinian communities, and between the public and the three main authorities in Palestine - the legislative, judiciary and unions. The project design was underpinned by the growing problem of division among young people in Palestinian society. Project stakeholders also repeatedly mentioned the broader political reality of life in the Palestine territories that impose restrictions that undermine the human rights for young Palestinians and influence their perception of human rights and justice.

At the time the project began, the process of ratifying the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, adopted by the African Union in January 2007, was moribund and there was no international project activity to invigorate it. The objective of the project was to strengthen civil society actors to build a constituency for the signing and ratification of the Charter. At the time the project was proposed, 15 ratifications were needed to bring the Charter into force, two countries (Ethiopia and Mauritania) had ratified the Charter and twenty-five had signed it, thus indicating their intention to ratify. Assessing the impact of the project was not easy. The intended direct beneficiaries were members of the African democracy community, whose network and ability to advocate for the Charter were strengthened. It is not possible, based on the timetable of ratifications and project activities, to convincingly demonstrate that the project greatly accelerated the coming into force of the Charter. Only three countries in which activities were implemented actually ratified the Charter. The project objective was not ratification itself but rather strengthening the advocacy community and facilitating ratification yet achieving ratification in target countries was an implicit objective of the project Ultimately, the sustainability of the project activity will also be a function of political will. The project was born of policy elites, implemented by policy elites, delivered results of direct relevance only to policy elites, yet promises substantial benefits to all the people of Africa, who will benefit from democracy.

At the time the project began, the process of ratifying the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, adopted by the African Union in January 2007, was moribund and there was no international project activity to invigorate it. The objective of the project was to strengthen civil society actors to build a constituency for the signing and ratification of the Charter. At the time the project was proposed, 15 ratifications were needed to bring the Charter into force, two countries (Ethiopia and Mauritania) had ratified the Charter and twenty-five had signed it, thus indicating their intention to ratify. Assessing the impact of the project was not easy. The intended direct beneficiaries were members of the African democracy community, whose network and ability to advocate for the Charter were strengthened. It is not possible, based on the timetable of ratifications and project activities, to convincingly demonstrate that the project greatly accelerated the coming into force of the Charter. Only three countries in which activities were implemented actually ratified the Charter. The project objective was not ratification itself but rather strengthening the advocacy community and facilitating ratification yet achieving ratification in target countries was an implicit objective of the project Ultimately, the sustainability of the project activity will also be a function of political will. The project was born of policy elites, implemented by policy elites, delivered results of direct relevance only to policy elites, yet promises substantial benefits to all the people of Africa, who will benefit from democracy.