Lessons

The grantee specialized in increasing the social participation of women in Azerbaijan. In this area, it had expertise, credibility, wide respect, and a strong network. It did not have these assets in elections and democratization. All of the planned outputs consisted of increasing the affiliation of women (and journalists) to the existing, flawed election system.

Partnerships were not strategically designed; the two partnerships formed by the principal implementing agency appear to have been largely partnerships of convenience, lacking strategic direction and substantive content. The grantee has a strong comparative advantage as a locally-based NGO outside Baku specialized in women’s empowerment, but it needs to leverage that comparative advantage by forming partnerships with groups with greater capacity in democratization.

Pairing with a more adversarial and higher-capacity NGO would have greatly leveraged project accomplishments and contributed to sustainability by better building capacity. No Memoranda of Understanding setting forth expectations and responsibilities were ever signed between the grantee and partners. The evaluators’ opinion is that these partnerships appear to have been based more on acquaintanceships and familiarity rather than strategic considerations. Neither partner organization had ever been involved in an elections project before.

Many of the professionals trained by the grantee before and during the project period have subsequently taken an active part in transitional justice related work in civil society, international organizations, the media and sometimes in state institutions in Burundi. Many representatives working on transitional justice and met by the evaluators had been trained by the grantee, and had used the skills they acquired to develop projects on behalf of their respective NGOs.

The project created a critical mass of well-trained people, who in turn helped civil society, government and international organizations to increase their work on transitional justice in Burundi.

Victims’ groups were established as a direct result of the project – for example groups of women who suffered from politically motivated sexual violence and survivors of the 1972 killings in Burundi.

The project strategy did not fully consider how the grantee’s intervention would be received by government stakeholders. The grantee had built a positive record with civil society and the UN mission based on earlier training and technical advice and on the grantee’s international credibility. However they did not have a similar record with the government officials that were to lead the National Consultation Steering Committee and its technical advisory team. The credibility that the grantee built with the police through the implementation of the census project did not translate into an open door at the National Consultation Steering Committee.

The project could most probably have been more efficient if it had been more closely managed by the grantee’s office in South Africa. Its greater involvement would have enhanced the value of the project in the eyes of implementing partners and provided valuable assistance to the staff working on Burundi.

Although it foresaw the possibility of politically motivated delays, the project had little in place in the way of mitigation. The strategy in relation to institutional stakeholders in Burundi was not fully developed – for example there was no attempt to formalize and set an agreed framework for the project’s support and technical advice to the National Consultation Steering Committee.

There was no explicit commitment on the part of the partners to achieving the project’s objective and results - as opposed to implementing the activities - and no formal agreement on operational standards. A formal Memorandum of Understanding between the three partners would have helped ensure more consistent implementation and follow-up of the activities regarding transitional justice in Burundi.